Risk-averse Supply Chain Coordination Model Based on Joint Promotion Effort under Strategic Customer Behavior

doi:10.12005/orms.2019.0223

Operations Research and Management Science ›› 2019, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (10): 50-56.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2019.0223

• Theory Analysis and Methodology Study • Previous Articles Next Articles

Risk-averse Supply Chain Coordination Model Based on Joint Promotion Effort under Strategic Customer Behavior

WANG Jun-ping¹, YAO Da-qing¹, MIN Jie²

1. School of Mathematics, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China;
2. Department of Mathematics and Physics, Anhui University of Architecture, Hefei 230022, China

Received:2017-12-28 Online:2019-10-25

顾客策略行为下基于联合促销努力的风险规避供应链协调模型

汪峻萍¹, 姚大庆¹, 闵杰²

1. 合肥工业大学数学学院,安徽合肥 230009;
2. 安徽建筑大学数理学院,安徽合肥 230022

作者简介:汪峻萍(1975-),女,安徽歙县人,副教授,博士,研究方向:运筹与优化,物流与供应链管理;姚大庆(1990-),男,硕士研究生,研究方向:供应链协调与优化;闵杰(1978-),男,安徽濉溪人,教授,博士,研究方向:库存控制,物流与供应链管理。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571002);安徽省自然科学基金资助项目(1508085MG141);合肥工业大学博士专项基金资助项目(JZ2015HGBZ0503)

Abstract

Abstract: Under the condition of the risk measurement criteria, the risk-averse supply chain coordination model based on the joint promotion effort is developed. The decision-making behaviors of the risk-averse retailer and risk-averse supplier are analyzed under the centralized and decentralized decision making systems, respectively. Main research conclusions are obtained: (1)In the centralized system, the price commitment can not only motivate the production of the supplier in the supply chain, but also mitigate the negative effects of the customer strategy behavior. (2)In the decentralized system, the retailer’s optimal order quantity and the supplier’s optimal sales effort increase with the increase of the risk aversion coefficient of retailer, but decrease with the increase of the risk aversion coefficient of suppliers; in addition, the retailer’s optimal sales effort is not related to the risk aversion coefficient of retailer and supplier. (3)Since the complexity of the supply chain, it is unable to use the traditional buy-back contract to realize the coordination of supply chain, but a combined contract is designed to realize the perfect coordination of supply chain.

Key words: supply chain coordination, strategic customer behavior, risk-aversion

摘要： 本文在考虑顾客策略行为情形下,利用条件风险度量准则建立了带有联合促销努力供应链协调模型,研究了风险规避对销售商和供应商决策行为的影响,得到了如下研究结论:(1)集中决策情形,价格承诺策略既可以激励供应商提高生产量,还能够有效降低顾客策略行为对其产生的负面影响。(2)分散决策情形,销售商风险规避度增大,销售商的订购量将增加,供应商的销售努力也将增加;供应商风险规避度增大,销售商的订购量将减小,供应商的销售努力也将减小;无论供应商和销售商的风险规避如何变化,销售商的销售努力不变。(3)利用回购和成本分担组成的混合契约可以实现供应链完美协调。

关键词: 供应链协调, 顾客策略行为, 风险规避

CLC Number:

F224

WANG Jun-ping, YAO Da-qing, MIN Jie. Risk-averse Supply Chain Coordination Model Based on Joint Promotion Effort under Strategic Customer Behavior[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2019, 28(10): 50-56.

汪峻萍, 姚大庆, 闵杰. 顾客策略行为下基于联合促销努力的风险规避供应链协调模型[J]. 运筹与管理, 2019, 28(10): 50-56.

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Risk-averse Supply Chain Coordination Model Based on Joint Promotion Effort under Strategic Customer Behavior

顾客策略行为下基于联合促销努力的风险规避供应链协调模型

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