Abstract: This paper develops a closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) model with a monopolist firm which produces the new product in the first period, and offers both the remanufactured product and the new product in the second period. This study assumes that the new product and remanufactured product are clearly distinguishable by the customers, so they have different prices in the market. Based on these assumptions, two models are constructed according to the case of the centralized closed-loop supply chain (the manufacturer collect the used products by itself) and the decentralized closed-loop supply chain (the manufacturer outsources the collection process to one third-party independent collector). Using the game theory, the equilibrium solutions between the recycling price decision and the retail price decision are derived and analyzed. Further, numerical examples are used to demonstrate the managerial results. It is shown that: (1)the closed-loop supply chain structure affects the price of remanufactured products and the recycling price of waste products, but has no influence on the pricing of new OEM products. (2)the impact of changes in recycling risks on price decisions depends on the structural characteristics of CLSC. When the recycling risk is low, the manufacturer’s self-recycling mode is better than the third-party recycler’s recycling mode in stimulating consumers’ demand for remanufactured products, encouraging consumers to return waste products and improving the overall efficiency of the closed-loop supply chain. When the recycling risk is high, the recycling mode of the third party recycler is better than that of the manufacturer. (3)the reduction of recycling risk makes the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain show a growing trend, which further reflects the economic value of remanufacturing. (4)OEM self-recovery of waste products should take into account the price competition between new products and remanufactured products. When the price competition is weak, OEM self-recycling used products can bring more profits to OEM; the price competition between new products and remanufactured products is also conducive to the improvement of demand for remanufactured products.

Key words: closed loop supply chain, pricing strategy, recycling risk, game theory

摘要： 随着资源的匮乏和环境污染的加剧,越来越多的企业和消费者开始关注废旧产品的回收再制造。针对制造商唯一寡头垄断市场竞争结构,引入回收风险,分别对制造商(OEM)自行回收废旧产品的闭环供应链、第三方回收商回收废旧产品的闭环供应链建立数学模型,分析给出各企业的最优差异定价规则,并从经济学意义上得到相关管理启示;数值实验的结果则进一步验证回购价格、回收风险、价格竞争强度对最优解的影响。研究结果表明:(1)闭环供应链结构会影响再制品价格及废旧产品的回收价格,但对OEM新品定价无影响。(2)回收风险的变化对价格决策的影响取决于闭环供应链的结构特征。当回收风险较低时,在激发消费者对再制品需求、促使消费者返回废旧产品、提升闭环供应链整体效率等方面,OEM自行回收模式优于第三方回收商回收模式;而当回收风险较高时,则第三方回收商回收模式优于OEM自行回收模式。(3)回收风险的降低使得闭环供应链总利润呈现出增长的趋势,进而进一步体现到再制造的经济价值。(4)OEM自行回收废旧产品需考虑到新品与再制品间的价格竞争强度,当价格竞争强度较弱时,OEM自行回收废旧产品可为OEM带来更多的利润;新品与再制品间的价格竞争也有利于再制品需求的提升。

关键词: 闭环供应链, 定价策略, 回收风险, 博弈