Abstract: This paper discusses how to prevent durable goods from producing a large amount of waste in the short term like fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) through extended producer responsibility (EPR). On the basis of existing research, from the perspective of planned obsolescence, this article builds a dynamic model of durable goods, based on continuous time using the optimal control method to explore the optimal result of centralized decision making and decentralized decision-making of market equilibrium. Meanwhile, this paper reveals the incentive effect of EPR constraints under different market structures for producers to extend the life of the product design. Finally, based on the analysis process of the theoretical model, the conclusions of the research are verified by numerical simulation and case study. The results show that under the perfect competition market structure, the implementation of a single Pigouvian tax or only deposit return system can realize the optimal output and also provide enough incentive for producers to extend the service life of the product design; In an imperfect competitive market structure, at least two EPR constraints, tax and subsidy, are needed to achieve the optimal outcome of output and design life.

Key words: durable goods, EPR policy tools, planned obsolescence, product design life

摘要： 本文探究如何安排延伸生产者责任(EPR)政策从而避免耐用品像快消品一样在短期产生大量废弃物的问题。文章在已有研究基础上,从计划报废的视角,构建了一个基于连续时间的动态耐用品模型,利用最优控制方法探究了集中式决策的最优结果和分散式决策的市场均衡,并基于二者的比较分析,揭示不同市场结构下EPR政策工具对生产者延长产品设计寿命的激励效果。最后基于理论模型的分析过程,通过数值模拟和案例分析对研究结论进行验证。研究表明,在市场完全竞争情形下,实施单一的庇古税或者仅通过押金-返还制度既可以将产出调节至最优水平,也能为生产者提供足够的激励延长其产品的设计寿命;在市场不完全竞争情形下,至少需要借助税收和补贴两种EPR政策工具的配合,才能实现产出和设计寿命的最优结果。

关键词: 耐用品, EPR政策工具, 计划报废, 产品设计寿命