Abstract: The popularization of the Internet, the advancement of information technology, and the development of e-commerce have given rise to online retail channels. The dual-channel consisting of offline and online plays a significant role as an intermediary in facilitating transactions between retailers and consumers, bringing numerous conveniences to shoppers. However, as society gradually transforms from the information age to the digital age, consumers’ shopping habits undergo a comprehensive transformation, and competition in the retail industry becomes increasingly fierce. Obviously, the dual-channel retail model can no longer meet the needs of companies for normal operations and competitiveness, and the entire retail industry is actively exploring new retail models that can support future development. At this time, as a new retail model that can promote the integration of online and offline development while providing consumers with a all-round and seamless shopping experience, omni-channel retail has rapidly gained application and practice in the industry, especially the “Buy-Online-Pick-up-in-Store”(BOPS) model. Retailers sell their products through dual-channel and omni-channel approaches inevitably triggers intense market competition. Although price is widely used as a common competitive tool, a single pricing strategy cannot effectively identify consumer segments or flexibly implement differential pricing. Coupons, as an effective tool for price regulation and channel coordination, can form a dual pricing mechanisms in conjunction with consumer price discrimination and market segmentation, in order to increase sales volume and expand market share by enhancing pricing flexibility, thus helping retail enterprises to maintain an advantageous position in the competition. This study can effectively guide retail enterprises to conduct omni-channel practices and enhance their competitiveness when facing various complex situations.
Dual-channel and omni-channel retailers achieve differential pricing across different channels by distributing coupons. Firstly, we construct a duopoly Bertrand game model to optimize the retailer’s single coupon distribution strategies by solving the optimal prices and coupon face values as binary decision variables for both dual-channel and omni-channel retailers. Secondly, we construct an asymmetric evolutionary game model for a two-population of retailers based on the channel quantity characteristics. This model is aimed to explore the long-term evolutionarily stable coupon distribution strategies of the retailer population. Finally, we make a sensitivity analysis of the evolutionarily stable strategies based on channel preferences and cross-price elasticity parameters. We also depict the evolutionary trends of retailer prices, coupon face values, consumer actual payments, and profits under the scenarios of pure strategies and mixed strategy evolutionarily stable points.
　　This paper has several interesting research findings. Specifically, when dual-channel retailers choose not to distribute coupons, they may gain substantial unit profits but remain at a disadvantage compared to omni-channel retailers. On the other hand, by distributing coupons, dual-channel retailers can intensify competition and actually gain a profit advantage. The evolutionary game model shows the existence of four groups of dual-population and one group of single-population pure strategy evolutionarily stable points. Due to the significant differences in consumer actual payments caused by whether coupons are distributed, which subsequently affects retailer profits, a mixed strategy equilibrium cannot be reached. The evolutionarily stable coupon distribution strategies are constantly adjusting dynamically to changes in channel preferences and cross-price elasticity coefficients. The continually evolving and updating coupon distribution strategies result in differentiated pricing across retail channels, leading to varying levels of competitiveness. As the competition becomes more intense, the evolutionarily stable prices and coupon face values decrease. However, the evolutionarily stable consumer actual payments increase. When differential pricing is implemented across all channels, it will be easy for two population retailers to be passively trapped in a lose-lose “prisoner’s dilemma” situation, resulting in a serious loss of evolutionary profits.

Key words: dual-channel, omni-channel, coupon distribution, evolutionary game

摘要： 针对通过双渠道和全渠道销售产品的零售商,构建双寡头Bertrand博弈模型,求解单次博弈的一般均衡,在此基础上,对两种群非对称零售商群体的电子优惠券投放策略进行演化博弈建模,分析策略调整的演化路径、演化均衡价格、优惠券面值和消费者实际支付,以及演化均衡利润的变化趋势。通过数值分析发现:存在四组双种群和一组单种群纯策略演化稳定点,随着渠道偏好和交叉弹性系数的变化进行动态调整。当交叉弹性适中时,两群体在所有渠道都实施区别定价,演化均衡价格、优惠券面值和消费者实际支付都越小,而当交叉弹性较低和较高时,差异定价的实施渠道有所减少,演化价格、面值和实际支付越大。参数与演化均衡利润呈现“U”型关系,通过双渠道销售的零售商群体投放优惠券会带来利润优势,但是会使双方陷入两败俱伤的“囚徒困境”中。

关键词: 双渠道, 全渠道, 优惠券投放, 演化博弈