Abstract: The problem of difficult and expensive financing of credit funds restricts the development of agriculture in China。The government adopts different measures to support the sustainable development of agriculture,including loan subsidy and policy-based guarantee mechanism. Most research on agricultural supply chain finance discusses the issues on performance, risk management, financing and return of supply chain finance. Few research studies the choice of financing strategy in agricultural supply chain. In addition, most current literature on government subsidies and policy guarantees uses empirical research methods to qualitatively describe concepts and values. Therefore, in the context of uncertain output, this paper uses the modeling method to study the subsidy and guarantee mechanism in government-led agricultural supply chain finance. By theoretically analyzing the value of government subsidies and policy guarantees on the entire agricultural supply chain and its members, our study provides a reference for the strategic choices of governments and banks. This study complements and develops the existing government-led risk management theory.
This paper establishes a single-cycle two-level supply chain model composed of a farmer,a core enterprise (referred to as company), a bank and a government. Assume that before production, the farmer does not have initial funds and needs to borrow from banks, and the company's operation is not subject to financial constraints. When the company places an order to the farmer, the wholesale price is determined, and the farmer accordingly determines the amount of agricultural production input. This paper assumes that the production cost function of the farmer is a quadratic function, including the productioncost for the production unit of agricultural products and the effort cost of the farmer to produce agricultural products, such as the time, energy, and technical input spent on production. The uncertainty of the output of agricultural productsis affected by natural factors. We assume that the random output factors of agricultural products follow a two-point distribution. When agricultural production is normal, the farmer will not default. When the production of agricultural products is affected by unfavorable conditions, the purchase fee paid by the company to the farmer may not be enough to repay the principal and interest of the bank's loan, and then the farmer may default. When the company buys all agricultural products produced by the farmer, the company only considers the cost of agricultural product acquisition, but does not consider the residual value of agricultural products, so the purchase volume (sales volume) is equal to the output volume. This article assumes that all supply chain members are risk-neutral.
Our study shows that under the circumstances of government subsidy, when the random output factor is higher and the loan interest rate is lower, the higher the loan interest subsidy rate, the higher the profit and social welfare of farmers, companies, and banks. In the guarantee mode, the reduction of guarantee rate is beneficial to the development of the farmer and society. Finally, we find that government subsidy reduces the financing cost of the farmer, but the real beneficiaries are the bank。However, policy-based guarantee mechanism reducing the bank's risk and loan interest rate, indirectly reduces the farmer's financing costs, and increases the profit of the farmer, company and social welfare.

Key words: agricultural supply chain finance, random yield, government subsidy, policy-based guarantee

摘要： 农户融资难、融资贵问题制约着我国农业的发展,为引导农业的可持续发展政府采取了各种措施,典型的有贷款利息补贴与政策性担保机制。本文建立了由农户、公司、银行和政府组成的供应链模型,探究了政府补贴与政策性担保对农业供应链运营的影响及其差异。研究表明,在政府补贴情景下,当随机产出因子较高和贷款利率较低时,贷款利息补贴率越高,农户、公司、银行的利润以及社会福利越高.在政策性担保情景下,担保费率的降低对农户和社会的发展都有利。政府补贴降低了农户的融资成本,但其最大受益者是银行;而政策性担保则真正作用在农户和企业,通过降低银行贷款风险促使银行降低贷款利率,实现了农户的融资成本降低,提升了农户和公司的利润并增加社会总福利。

关键词: 农业供应链金融, 产出不确定, 政府补贴, 政策性担保