Abstract: Since reform and opening up, China’s economic and social development has achieved remarkable results, but it has also paid a huge cost of resources and environment, such as “the Schaeffler crisis”. At present, a large number of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises have serious environmental pollution problems, which have become the main source of pollution. A large number of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises have been shut down under the escalating government environmental supervision. However, as an important force in the development of the national economy, small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises play an irreplaceable role in adjusting industrial structure, promoting economic development, expanding employment and maintaining social stability. Their closure triggered a series of chain reactions such as “Schaeffler supply disruption” and other cases, resulting in serious economic and social consequences. Therefore, how to reasonably and effectively control the pollution of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises has become an urgent problem to be solved.
At present, research on pollution control strategies of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises in academic circles mostly focuses on the mode of direct participation of multiple entities outside the industrial chain. However, external entities including government, ENGO, the public, financial institutions and scientific research institutions have limited resources and strength, so the cost of participating in pollution control of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises alone is high. Different subjects also have free-riding behaviors based on their own interests, which leads to insufficient governance motivation and poor governance effect. Multi-subject collaborative governance model has gradually become an important policy approach for the state and local governments to break the dilemma of environmental pollution control. In addition, compared with the external entities, the information among the entities in the supply chain is more symmetrical. Especially, the core enterprises of the supply chain have innate advantages in the information of the upstream and downstream small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises. In addition, the green pressure of upstream and downstream suppliers and customers in the supply chain will also significantly promote the green innovation behavior of enterprises. Therefore, the internal environmental governance based on supply chain enters the research horizon. In terms of mechanism, core enterprises can control the pollution control behavior of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises through environmental contract, green procurement, audit supervision and other means. On the one hand, although the core enterprises’ participation in pollution control of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises is to fulfill a higher level of social responsibility, which is not legally binding, the profit-driven enterprises will make the core enterprises have problems such as lack of motivation when leading pollution control of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises. However, as core enterprises realize that the environmental performance of upstream and downstream suppliers will have an impact on their reputation and market attractiveness, supply chain integration and collaboration can tap the value creativity of supply chain social responsibility, and based on the logic of stakeholder cooperation, supply chain corporate social responsibility co-governance becomes an important governance choice. This means that the discipline imposed by the government, ENGO, the public, financial institutions and other subjects on core enterprises and the incentive of providing resources will also become the main driving force for core enterprises to participate in small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises’ environmental governance.
In order to solve the pollution problem of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises, explore co-governance mode of multi-subject participation, this paper takes pollution control of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises as the research object, adopts the evolutionary game under the assumption of bounded rationality to study the dynamic evolution process of pollution control behavior of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises. The core is to build evolutionary game model respectively under a control mechanism whereby the government and the public exert pressure through core enterprises and the cooperative mechanism provided by financial institutions, analyze the pollution governance behavior of core enterprises and upstream small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises, and try to find the conditions and influencing factors to reach the optimal stability state that small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises control pollution under theleadership of core enterprises. Moreover, Matlab is used for simulation analysis to simulate the strategy selection behavior and dynamic evolution process of core enterprises and small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises under different initial states to verify the effectiveness of the model.
The research results show: 1)The reduction of governance cost of core enterprises and small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises, the increase of the reputation incentive benefits of core enterprises leading pollution control and the positive industry benefits of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises when they control pollution and the negative industry benefits they suffer when they do not control pollution can effectively encourage the system to evolve to the optimal stable point. 2)The increase in financial support that medium-sized manufacturing enterprises obtain from financial institutions based on the overall credit of their own and core enterprises can contribute to the implementation of green supply chain smoothly. 3)The simultaneous implementation of the two mechanisms is more conducive to the system evolution to the optimal stability point.

Key words: pollution governance, the small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises, core enterprise, financing institution, evolutionary game

摘要： 为破解中小制造企业污染治理困境,探索多元共治模式,本文分别在政府、环保非政府组织及公众等通过核心企业施加压力的管束机制和金融机构提供资源的合作机制下,构建核心企业和中小制造企业之间的演化博弈模型,分析核心企业及中小制造企业污染治理行为的动态演化,试图找到达到最优稳定点(主导治理,治理)所需满足的条件及影响因素,并对结果进行仿真验证。研究发现:1)降低核心企业和中小制造企业的污染治理成本、增加核心企业主导治理的声誉激励收益及中小制造企业治理污染时获得的正面行业效益和不治理污染时遭受的负面行业损失,能有效激励系统演化至最优稳定点;2)提升中小制造企业依据核心企业信用从金融机构获得的绿色信贷支持,有助于系统演化至最优稳定点;3)两种机制同时实施更有利于系统演化至最优稳定点。

关键词: 污染治理, 中小制造企业, 核心企业, 金融机构, 演化博弈