Abstract: With the increasingly serious problems such as global warming and industrial production pollution, the government attaches more importance to the issue of carbon emission reduction, and enterprise low-carbonproduction is imminent and in urgent need of solution. Based on the government’s urgent appeal to enterprise low-carbon production and the reality of consumers’ preference for low-carbon production, enterprises are turning to low-carbon production development mode. However, it is difficult for most enterprises to independently implement low-carbon production due to lack of funds or immature carbon emission reduction technology. Therefore, this paper introduces low-carbon service providers to solve this problem. The goal of low-carbon service providers is to provide technical services of carbon emission reduction for manufacturing enterprises that are unable to carry out low-carbon production due to their own reasons but have a strong desire for carbon emission reduction. To ease the awkward situation, in this paper, the government, enterprises and low-carbon service providers are taken as the main body of the evolutionary game, and the three-party evolutionary game model of the government, enterprises and low-carbon service providers is constructed. The game process of the three-party stability strategy is analyzed by using the evolutionary game theory. Finally, the numerical simulation of the MATLAB software is used to analyze the evolution path of the government, enterprises and low-carbon service providers. The obtained simulation analysis results are convenient for expanding the research ideas of later scholars, enriching the evolutionary game study of the government, enterprises and low-carbon service providers, promoting the development of low-carbon service providers in low-carbon economy, and providing theoretical research basis for the development of China’s low-carbon economy.
Traditional game theory has two features: first, it assumes that all game players are completely rational in the game process; second, the decision of game players is carried out under the condition of complete information symmetry, and the interests of game players only consider the game between of designated players. With the full combination of traditional game theory and Darwinian biological evolution, evolutionary game theory was born. Payoff matrix, also known as payoff matrix, refers to the representation of the benefits of different game players into the same matrix according to the strategy combination of game players. The benefits of game players in the system are not only related to their own strategies, but also closely related to the strategy selection of other game players. The payoff matrix is mainly used to describe the strategy selection and payoff situation of all game players in the model, which is an important basis for game players to adjust their strategies. Replication dynamic equation: The definition of replication dynamic equation was proposed by Taylor and Jonker in 1978. It was initially used to describe the cycle of adjustment of decision-making behavior of game players in the system over time. In evolutionary game theory, game players will adjust their own strategies according to interests, give up low-return strategies and choose high-return strategies. Meanwhile, other game players in the system will also adjust their strategies according to the changes in the strategies of game players in the system. According to the collation and induction, it can be concluded that such change rules can be described quantitatively. And the tool for this characterization is to replicate dynamic equations. Evolutionary stability strategy: As an important part of evolutionary game theory, evolutionary stability strategy plays an important role in the development of evolutionary game theory. In 1973, Smith and Price combined classical biological evolution with traditional game theory to obtain evolutionarily stable strategy based on population study. Evolutionary stable strategy means that the game players in the system reach an equilibrium state after learning and adjusting for many times, but this state is easy to be broken. When some factors of the system change, the game players will learn and adjust their own strategies according to the latest situation to ensure the maximization of benefits. With time, the system will eventually reach a steady state. The steady-state situation means that the system adopts evolutionary stability strategy.
The cost of government regulation has a negative effect on the government’s choice of regulation strategy. Firms are more sensitive to penalties than subsidies. By reducing the cost of government regulation, increasing the penalty for enterprises that do not implement low-carbon production and reducing the service cost of low-carbon service providers, we can effectively promote the development of the tripartite evolutionary game model to a stable strategy, so as to promote the development of our low-carbon economy.
At present, there are few studies on low-carbon service providers by scholars, and even fewer studies on low-carbon service providers in the low-carbon evolutionary game. Therefore, when building the evolutionary game model, the consideration of whether there are other interest relationships between the government and low-carbon service providers and whether there are other interest contractual relationships between enterprises and low-carbon service providers may be flawed. The relationship among the government, enterprises and low-carbon service providers should be discussed in the future.

Key words: low carbon economy, low carbon service providers, evolutionary game, simulation analysis

摘要： 基于企业低碳发展的需要和消费者存在低碳偏好的现实背景下,本文构建了政府、企业及低碳服务提供商三方演化博弈模型,运用演化博弈理论分析三方稳定策略的博弈过程,最后利用MATLAB软件进行数值仿真,分析了政府、企业及低碳服务提供商三方的演化路径。结果表明:政府监管成本对政府选择监管策略起负向作用;相对于补贴力度,企业对惩罚力度更加敏感;通过降低政府监管成本、加大对不实行低碳生产的企业的处罚及降低低碳服务提供商的服务成本等途径能够有效的推动三方演化博弈模型向稳定策略发展,以期推动我国低碳经济的发展。

关键词: 低碳经济, 低碳服务提供商, 演化博弈, 仿真分析