Abstract: In 2016, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council issued the “Guiding Opinions on the Pilot Work of the Reform of the Vertical Management System for Monitoring, Supervision and Law Enforcement of Environmental Protection Organizations Below the Province”, pointing out that the environmental protection management system of local governments below the provincial level should gradually complete the transformation to a vertical management model. Until now, the reform of the vertical management system of environmental protection agencies below the provincial level has been basically completed, and the operation of the vertical management system of environmental protection agencies is advancing in an orderly manner. According to the “2020 China Ecological Environment Status Bulletin”, although the overall quality of China’s ecological environment has been improved, the protection of the ecological environment is still facing a severe situation. How to promote the vertical management system is playing a more effective role in promoting the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development requires analysis and discussion of local environmental governance issues under this system. The integration of local environmental governance entities into a system for research, can clarify the interaction relationship among subjects and the direction of strategy adjustment and the entire system operation efficiently and stably, which is of great important practical significance for further improving the ecological environment and optimizing the strategic behavior of relevant subjects of local environmental governance. This paper constructs a four-party game model of the Municipal Monitoring Center—Municipal Ecological Environment Bureau—Local Government—Enterprise under the vertical management system. Firstly, the average expectation about the strategy of each subject is calculated, and according to the Malthusian equation, the four-dimensional dynamical system of the four players is obtained, and then the Jocabian matrix of the strategy is obtained. Secondly, in the stabilization strategy analysis, Lyapuno’s first law is used to determine the conditions required for local environmental governance-related subjects to choose the ideal evolutionary stabilization strategy by judging whether the eigenvalue sign is equivalent to a stabilization point. Finally, based on the relevant data of Chongqing City and Xingtai City in Hebei Province, the data comes from the “2019 Xingtai City National Economic and Social Development Statistical Bulletin”, “2019 Chongqing Municipality National Economic and Social Development Statistical Bulletin”, etc. They are publicly available.Matlab software is used to simulate the evolution trend of the system, the control variable method is used to study the interaction between variables, and the numerical simulation empirical analysis is carried out. The study finds that increasing local government interference costs, and improving the monitoring and assessment coefficients and rewards for local environmental protection agencies can reduce the indirect interference of local governments on the strict monitoring and law enforcement of local environmental protection agencies; Improving the evaluation coefficient and rewards for environmental law enforcement of local ecological environment bureaus is helpful to solve the dual leadership dilemma of the local ecological environment bureau, but the strategic tendency of the local government needs to be considered; Enterprises will measure the magnitude of the negative impact of the accident and choose either superior production or inferior production. The further research shows that the collusion between government and enterprise is an important factor that affects the strict performance of duties of each subject. The central government should pay attention to the control of the trends of local environmental protection agencies and improve the supervision and welfare benefits of environmental protection agencies. However, based on the consideration of government-enterprise collusion, the measures of increasing the interference cost of the local government, the evaluation coefficient and rewards of the municipal environmental bureau shall be used cautiously. In order to avoid hindering the ideal state of “environmental protection agencies strictly perform their duties, the government strengthens their main responsibility, and enterprises produce in an environmentally friendly manner”.

Key words: vertical management, environmental governance, evolutionary game, numerical simulation

摘要： 在现行环保管理体制下,将地方环境治理相关主体共同纳入到一个体系中进行研究对于进一步改善生态环境、优化地方环境治理相关主体的策略行为具有重要现实意义。本文构建了驻市监测中心—市级生态环境局—地方政府—企业四方博弈模型,并基于河北邢台市、重庆市相关数据进行数值仿真实证分析。研究发现,增加地方政府干扰成本、提高对地方环保机构的考核系数与奖励对减轻地方政府对地方环保机构严格监测执法的干扰有重要作用;企业会衡量事故发生负面影响的大小而选择优生产或劣生产。进一步研究表明,政企合谋是影响各主体严格履职尽责的一个重要因素。中央要注重对地方环保机构动向的把控;提高对环保机构的考核监管与福利待遇,但基于对政企合谋的考虑,需谨慎运用增加地方政府干扰成本、对市级生态环境局的考核系数与奖励的措施。

关键词: 垂直管理, 环境治理, 演化博弈, 数值仿真