Abstract: Effective implementation and compliance of operation regulation in WTE PPP project is a key factor to the success and sustainable development of the project. In the game of WTE PPP project, the two parties of the game are two populations: Local government and social capital. Under the condition of information asymmetry and resource restriction, their behavior choices are chosen according to their own short-term interests. Local governments may have two choices in the operation regulation of WTE PPP project: Strict and lax supervision behavior. There may also be two behaviorchoices in social capital: Compliance with regulations and violation of regulations.
Firstly by far, most research on WTE projects focuses on key success factors, risk management, benefit distribution, concession pricing and other related issues, while there is little research on operational regulation. Secondly, most of the existing studies use traditional game theory to conduct static analysis of the strategic behaviors between subjects, which is difficult to describe the interactive process of the complex strategic behaviors of different participants. In view of this, this paper employs the evolutionary game theory, from the perspective of social participation, by constructing the two-dimensional dynamic system model of the game between local government and social capital, and analyzing the behavior selection of local government and social capital in the model, and four propositions are put forward and proved. Next, by using matlab software, the numerical simulation analysis of the behavior selection evolution process between local government and social capital in different scenarios is made.
The results of this study indicate that driven by profit, social capital has a strong motivation to choose the behaviors that violate regulations. The effect of social participation on local government behavior is significantly higher than that of private sector, and with the increase of social participation, local government will show obvious “free riding” behavior.Reputation on private sector’s behavior restriction is related to the degree of social participation. For example,in the case of higher social participation, excessive reputation loss can promote the social capital to obey the regulations. In the case of lower social participation, the accountability will form a certain constraint effect on the lax behavior of local governments,however, as long as the local governments can obtain greater benefits, they still have the tendency to take that lax behavior. Higher political praise can effectively motivate and guide local government to adopt strict supervision behavior on regulation, and under this condition, supplemented by reputation mechanism can finally achieve the ideal (strict, compliance) state.

Key words: Public-Private Partnerships, operational regulation, evolutionary game theory, social participation

摘要： PPP模式下垃圾焚烧发电项目运营规制的有效执行与遵守是决定项目能否获得成功及可持续发展的一个十分关键的因素,运用演化博弈理论,从社会参与的视角对垃圾焚烧发电项目运营规制的公私行为路径选择问题进行研究。结果表明社会参与对地方政府的行为约束效果要显著高于社会资本,且随着社会参与的增加,地方政府会表现出明显的“搭便车”行为;声誉损失对社会资本的行为约束与社会参与的程度有关,只有在较高的社会参与下,较高的声誉损失能促使其采取遵守规制的行为;较高的政治好评能有效激励与引导地方政府采取严格的规制监管行为,在此条件下,再辅之以声誉机制就能最终实现(严格,遵守规制)的理想状态。

关键词: PPP, 运营规制, 演化博弈, 社会参与