Abstract: The success of the digital platform development model depends on the joint efforts of all stakeholders, and its antitrust issue is attracting more and more attention from various countries. In the context of the increasing prominence of network effects and concentration effects in the digital economy, some digital platforms, after developing into super platforms, restrict the development of other competitors by implementing exclusive dealings measures, destroying the market environment of fair competition. In order to deeply analyze the mechanisms and measures of antitrust regulation for digital platforms, this paper takes the exclusive dealings behavior regulation of digital platforms as the realistic scenario, and constructs an evolutionary game model of antitrust regulation among the government, digital platforms and merchants. By using Matlab numerical simulation, the paper studies the influence of related parameters on the strategies of the three parties. The main conclusions are as follows:
First, the ideal equilibrium solution of the evolutionary game shows the role of the government in ensuring the orderly development of the relevant market of digital platforms. By solving the evolutionary game model of the government, digital platforms and merchants, eight special equilibrium points can be obtained. Among them, the strategy sets E3(0,1,0),E4(0,1,1),E5(1,0,0),E7(1,1,0) and E8(1,1,1) are asymptotically stable points under certain conditions, but according to the realistic scenario of the exclusive dealings behavior and antitrust regulation of digital platforms, E5(1,0,0) is the ideal equilibrium point. This indicates that when the government adopts effective antitrust regulation measures, digital platforms will tend not to implement monopoly behavior, and enterprises will tend to cooperate.
Second, the intensity of antitrust supervision and enforcement by the government is an important factor affecting the development of the relevant market of digital platforms. The antitrust intensity of the government has a negative impact on the strategy choice of digital platforms to implement the exclusive dealings behavior, but beyond a certain intensity threshold, it will cause the strategy choice probability of digital platforms and the government to enter a fluctuating and unbalanced state. At the same time, the monopoly position has a positive impact on the strategy choice of digital platforms to implement monopoly behavior. The higher the monopoly position of digital platforms, the stronger the willingness of the government to choose antitrust regulation strategy, and the stronger the willingness of merchants to choose non-cooperation strategy.
Third, different antitrust policy tools may bring different realistic effects. Both antitrust punishment and monopoly damage compensation intensity can reduce the willingness of digital platforms to implement the exclusive dealings behavior. When the government’s antitrust punishment for digital platforms is large or the monopoly damage compensation intensity faced by digital platforms is larger, the system is more likely to form benign steady-state equilibrium, at which time digital platforms tend not to implement monopoly behavior, and merchants also tend to choose cooperation. However, the government’s antitrust punishment for digital platforms has a stronger effect, and merchants are constrained by the monopoly position of digital platforms, and the damage compensation intensity has a weaker constraint on the monopoly behavior of digital platforms.
Overall, this paper fully considers the antitrust intensity of the government and the monopoly position of platform enterprises, and analyzes the mechanisms and measures of antitrust regulation for digital platforms. It makes up for the shortcomings of existing research that mostly starts from a single subject perspective, and lacks systematic and complex research on the monopoly problem of platform economy and the analysis of government’s role. The research results can provide guidance for the policy formulation of regulating the exclusive dealings behavior of digital platforms, and offer theoretical support for maintaining the fair competition and orderly development of the relevant market of digital platforms.

Key words: digital platform, digital economy, antitrust, evolutionary game, exclusive dealings

摘要： 数字平台发展模式的成功离不开各利益相关方的共同努力,其反垄断问题越来越受到各国重视。本文构建了政府、数字平台和商家三方的反垄断演化博弈模型,研究数字平台“二选一”垄断行为与监管策略。结果表明:当满足一定条件时,可以实现政府反垄断监管,数字平台不垄断且商家合作的理想稳态均衡;政府反垄断强度对数字平台垄断策略选择具有负向影响,但超过一定强度阈值,会导致数字平台和政府的策略选择概率进入震荡的不均衡状态;数字平台垄断地位越高其选择垄断行为的意愿就越高,政府选择反垄断监管策略的意愿越强,同时商家选择不合作策略的意愿也越强;反垄断惩罚与垄断损害赔偿力度均能降低数字平台的垄断意愿,但反垄断惩罚对数字平台具有更强的约束作用。

关键词: 数字平台, 数字经济, 反垄断, 演化博弈, 二选一