Abstract: Knowledge transfer stands as a critical avenue for venture capital (VC) and entrepreneurial firms to mitigate collaboration risks and enhance cooperation efficiency. The incentivization of entrepreneurial firms to enhance their proactivity in knowledge transfer has been a pivotal subject in entrepreneurial collaboration. However, within the intricate reality of collaboration between entrepreneurial firms and VC, the incentive process often accompanies inconsistencies in the perception of knowledge transfer by entrepreneurial firms, giving rise to incentive biases and fairness imbalances. Acknowledging this, the present study focuses on the issues of incentive biases and fairness imbalances in the knowledge transfer motivation process of entrepreneurial firms. It specifically explores the relationship between entrepreneurial knowledge transfer and VC incentives, emphasizing the dual factors of complete rationality and the interaction between incentive biases and fairness preferences. The aim is to provide a multi-faceted perspective and reference for the theoretical support and practical implementation of collaboration mechanisms between VC and entrepreneurial firms.
The study constructs a model of entrepreneurial knowledge transfer incentives under conditions of complete rationality and the dual effects of incentive biases and fairness preferences. Building upon mathematical models and equilibrium solution analyses, the study employs model construction, theoretical deduction, and simulation analysis to explore the micro-level mechanisms of incentive biases, fairness imbalances, knowledge transfer quantity, and risk costs on VC incentive intensity selection and entrepreneurial knowledge transfer effort levels.
Under conditions of complete rationality, incentive biases are positively correlated with entrepreneurial knowledge transfer effort levels, with negative incentive biases weakening the proactiveness of entrepreneurial firms in knowledge transfer, and positive incentive biases having the opposite effect. The impact of incentive biases on the optimal VC incentive intensity is influenced by knowledge transferability and risk costs, exhibiting an inverted U-shaped relationship. In scenarios involving both fairness preferences and incentive biases, the presence of fairness preferences intensifies the impact of incentive biases on the proactiveness of entrepreneurial firms in knowledge transfer, showing a U-shaped relationship with knowledge transfer effort levels. On the other hand, the relationship among incentive biases, fairness preferences, and the optimal VC incentive intensity is complex, influenced by knowledge transferability and risk costs. Specifically, under conditions of advantage inequality, positive incentive biases increase the proactiveness of entrepreneurial firms in knowledge transfer, and higher perceived fairness strengthens their willingness to transfer knowledge. VC needs to appropriately increase incentive intensity to ensure the proactiveness of entrepreneurial firms in knowledge transfer while considering its own incentive costs. Under conditions of disadvantage inequality, within a limited range of negative incentive biases, VC can achieve high incentives at lower costs through differentiated incentive intensities. However, with the exacerbation of negative incentive biases and a preference for disadvantage inequality, VC needs to increase incentive intensity to mitigate the negative effects of unequal benefits on entrepreneurial knowledge transfer.
Further research could extend to aspects such as collaboration models and structural relationships between VC and entrepreneurial firms for a comprehensive understanding of entrepreneurial collaboration mechanisms. Additionally, the research can expand to different industry backgrounds of VC and entrepreneurial collaboration, as well as multi-party games under typical social preference scenarios. Further refinement of research objects and a deeper exploration of the micro-mechanisms of collaboration models could provide more specific and practical theoretical guidance for actual entrepreneurial practices.

Key words: entrepreneur, knowledge transfer, incentive mechanism, incentive deviation, fair preference

摘要： 知识转移是创投与创业企业降低合作风险、提升合作效率的重要途经,如何激励创业企业提高知识转移积极性一直是创业合作的重要议题。考虑到创业合作双方对知识转移内容及行为观测、评估的不一致及由此诱发的激励偏差和公平失衡问题,研究构建了完全理性情形和激励偏差与公平偏好双重作用情形下的创业企业知识转移激励模型,并深入探讨了激励偏差和公平偏好对创投最优激励强度和创业企业知识转移最优努力水平的影响。研究表明:在完全理性情形下,激励偏差与创投最优激励强度呈倒U型关系,与创业企业知识转移最优努力水平正相关;在公平偏好和激励偏差共同作用情形下,创投最优激励强度选择呈现出显著复杂性,需综合考虑公平偏好、激励偏差、知识可转移量和风险成本等因素以实现最优激励,同时公平偏好加剧了激励偏差对创业企业知识转移意愿的影响程度,与知识转移努力水平U型相关。

关键词: 创业企业, 知识转移, 激励机制, 激励偏差, 公平偏好