Abstract: In this paper, we study the information disclosure problem in R&D outsourcing when the enterprise outsources two homogeneous R&D tasks to two servicers. Considering these two servicers have different knowledge absorptive capacities and information capturing capacities, we assume only the servicer with poor information capturing capacity doesn’t know the other servicer’s knowledge absorptive capacity. We develop a Stackelberg model to study the optimal information disclosure strategies of both the enterprise and the servicer with strong information capturing capacity. We then reveal the optimal information processing strategy of the servicer with poor information capturing capacity. We further illustrate the conclusions by numerical simulations. We find that only when the revenue that the servicer with weaker knowledge absorptive capacity obtains from selling per unit product is relatively lower, should the enterprise disclose the knowledge absorptive capacity of the other servicer. Only when the knowledge absorptive capacity of the servicer with strong information capturing capacity is weaker, should it disclose its knowledge absorptive capacity. The servicer with poor information capturing capacity should always believe the information disclosed by the other servicer. Information disclosure strategies of both the enterprise and the servicer with strong information capturing capacity have different influences on each side.

Key words: knowledge transfer, R&, D outsourcing, knowledge absorptive capacity, information capturing capacity, information disclosure

摘要： 针对两服务商竞争的研发外包知识转移,考虑两个服务商知识吸收能力、信息获取能力均不同,且信息劣势方不知道信息优势方的知识吸收能力。通过建立以企业为领导者,两个服务商为跟随者的Stackelberg主从博弈模型,研究了企业和信息优势方的知识吸收能力披露决策,以及信息劣势方的信息处理决策,并用算例对结论加以说明。研究表明:仅当知识吸收能力较弱的服务商索取的单位报酬相对较低时,企业应披露信息优势方的知识吸收能力;仅当信息优势方知识吸收能力较弱时,其应披露自身知识吸收能力;信息劣势方应始终遵循信息优势方的信息披露策略;各方信息披露决策对企业和服务商均有不同影响。

关键词: 知识转移, 研发外包, 知识吸收能力, 信息获取能力, 信息披露