Environmental Regulation, Environmental R&D and Green Technology Progress

doi:10.12005/orms.2019.0038

Abstract

Abstract: In order to encourage and guide the development of green technology and drive collaborative progress of preventive technology and processing technology, it is necessary to develop the function of technological progress guidance of environmental regulation, and explore its transmission mechanism. This paper analyses the relevance of environmental regulation, environmental R&D and green technological progress from a game theoretic perspective. The research shows that environmental R&D is an important transmission path of environmental regulation to promote green technological progress. The policy combination of environmental taxes and environmental subsidies help to encourage enterprises' environmental R&D on pollution prevention technology and pollution treatment technology, correct the invalid spending on environmental R&D, so as to improve the level of enterprise green technology. The intensity of environmental subsidies will affect the technological progress effect of environmental regulation policy combination. There is a universal application strategy of implementation for the combination of green technological progress guidance of environmental policies: when the government implements a strict environmental tax policy, it needs supplement with environmental subsidies, and part of the excess subsidy should be used to support the third party governance market of environmental protection. The main way of regulation policy combination to promote social welfare is based on coordinated progress through pollution prevention technology and pollution treatment technology, by which we can increase the cost of production, reduce pollution or production and increase the amount of pollution treatment.

Key words: environmental regulation, environmental R&, D, green technology progress, duopoly game, regulatory strategy

摘要： 为鼓励和引导绿色技术发展,驱动预防性技术和处理性技术协同进步,有必要开发环境规制的绿色技术进步导向功能,并探究其传导机理。论文通过建立双寡头同时博弈模型对环境规制、环境研发与绿色技术进步进行关联分析。研究表明:环境研发是环境规制推动绿色技术进步的重要传导路径;环境补贴力度会显著影响环境规制政策组合的技术进步效果;绿色技术进步导向的环境规制的政策组合存在一个普适性较强的应用策略;环境税和环境补贴的规制政策组合能够有效增进社会福利,具体表现为通过污染预防技术和污染处理技术的协同进步带来的产量增加、生产成本减少、污染产生量减少以及污染处理量增加。

关键词: 环境规制, 环境研发, 绿色技术进步, 双寡头博弈, 规制策略

CLC Number:

F420

KONG Fan-bin, YUAN Yi-jun. Environmental Regulation, Environmental R&D and Green Technology Progress[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2019, 28(2): 98-105.

孔繁彬, 原毅军. 环境规制、环境研发与绿色技术进步[J]. 运筹与管理, 2019, 28(2): 98-105.

References

[1] Requatea T, Unoldb W. Environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology: will the true ranking please stand up?[J]. European Economic Review, 2003,47(1): 125-146.
[2] Krass D, Nedorezov T,Ovchinnikov A. Environmental taxes and the choice of green technology[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2013, 22(5): 1035-1055.
[3] Arguedas D, Camacho E , Zofío J L. Environmental policy instruments: technology adoption incentives with imperfect compliance[J]. Environmental & Resource Economics, 2010, 47(5): 261-274.
[4] 许士春,何正霞,龙如银.环境政策工具比较:基于企业减排的视角[J].系统工程理论与实践,2012,32(11):2351-2362.
[5] 何欢浪,岳咬兴.策略性环境政策:环境税和减排补贴的比较分析[J].财经研究,2009,35(2):136-143.
[6] Ulph A, Ulph D. The optimal time path of a carbon tax[J]. Oxford Economic Papers, 1994, 46(10): 857-868.
[7] Requatea T. Timing and commitment of environmental policy, adoption of new technology and repercussions on R&D[J]. Environmental & Resource Economics, 2005, 31(2): 175-199.
[8] 侯玉梅,贾萌,陈天培,孙晨阳,朱立春,魏鹍.碳关税下政府补贴政策及企业减排研发决策的研究[J].生态经济,2016,32(3):52-58+63.
[9] 李敏,刘青.技术创新补贴和碳税约束下政府与企业行为博弈研究[J].东南大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2015,17(7):91-99+147-148.
[10] 郁培丽,石俊国,窦姗姗,孙广生.技术创新、溢出效应与最优环境政策组合[J].运筹与管理,2014,3(10):237-242.
[11] 原毅军,耿殿贺.环境政策传导机制与中国环保产业发展——基于政府、排污企业与环保企业的博弈研究[J].中国工业经济,2010,271(10):65-74.
[12] Greaker M, Rosendahl K E. Environmental policy with upstream pollution abatement technology firms[J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2008, 56(3): 246-259.
[13] Greaker M. Spillovers in the development of new pollution abatement technology: a new look at the Porter-hypothesis[J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2006, 52(1): 411-420.
[14] F?re R, Grosskopf S, Pasurka C. Joint production of good and bad outputs with a network application[J]. Encyclopedia of Energy, Natural Resources and Environmental Economics, 2013, 12(2): 109-118.
[15] Rosendahl K E. Cost-effective environmental policy: implications of induced technological change[J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2004, 48(3): 1099-1121.
[16] Erbas B C, Abler D G. Environmental policy with endogenous technology from a game theoretic perspective: the case of the US pulp and paper industry[J]. Environmental & Resource Economics, 2008, 40(3): 425-444.