Abstract: In May 2022, the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council issued the Programme for the Implementation of Rural Construction Actions, stressing the principles of “guiding and motivating the participation of farmers” and “integrating the promotion of construction and care”. How to reach a collective action of public facilities management and care, so as to avoid the “tragedy of the commons” has always been an important issue in the field of public resources governance set. This study focuses on rural irrigation facilities and explores the factors affecting farmers’ collective care behaviour through empirical analysis. This study innovatively applies evolutionary game theory to formulate and empirically test hypotheses on factors affecting the realisation of collective care of irrigation facilities. The results of the empirical research are of great significance in guiding farmers to voluntarily participate in the joint management and care of public resources, giving full play to the main role of farmers, realising the effective governance of public resources, and promoting the action of rural construction.
This paper proposes three hypotheses on the factors affecting the realisation of joint care of agricultural irrigation facilities based on mathematical models and evolutionary game theory. One is that it is more difficult to achieve joint care of irrigation facilities in villages with non-farm employment opportunities compared to villages without non-farm employment opportunities. Second, the probability of joint care becoming an evolutionarily stable strategy will be the greatest when incomes among farmers are equal. Third, the effect of village size on reaching joint care of irrigation facilities is uncertain. In this study, two towns (Hongkeli Township and Dalianhe Township) and two townships (Yinglan Korean Township and Yugong Township) in Yilan County, Heilongjiang Province, are selected as the survey area, and 104 natural village leaders in the four townships are randomly selected as the interview subjects for the questionnaire survey. This study uses the Tobit regression analysis model to test the hypotheses.
The results show that: (1)Joint labour opportunities have a significant positive effect on the probability of reaching joint stewardship. (2)Degree of non-agriculturalisation has a significant negative effect on the probability of reaching joint stewardship. (3)The proximity of agricultural income promotes farmers’ participation in stewardship. (4)The relationship between village size and the probability of achieving joint care of irrigation facilities is inverted “U” shape.
Based on the results of the study, the article suggests the following policy implications: improving the punishment mechanism for “free-riding” in various types of common labour, forming a selective incentive system, reducing the difference in farm income between small-scale farmers and large-scale operation, cultivating an ideological system in small-scale villages, and realizing the visibility of individual contributions in large-scale villages are the key to achieving the common management and care of irrigation facilities.

Key words: evolutionary game theory, irrigation facilities, joint management and protection, collective action, rural construction action

摘要： 如何达成公共设施管护的集体行动,从而规避“公地悲剧”一直以来是公共资源治理集体行动领域的重要议题。为引导农民自愿参与,发挥农民主体作用,有效推进乡村建设行动,本研究基于数理模型和演化博弈论,提出实现农业灌溉设施共同管护影响因素的假设,对黑龙江省104位自然村负责人进行问卷调查,运用Tobit模型实证检验假设。结果表明:(1)共同劳动机会对达成共同管护有显著正向影响。(2)非农业化程度对达成共同管护有显著负向影响。(3)耕地流转比例的估计值显著为负,说明经营规模和农业收入差距越大,越不容易达成共同管护。(4)户数达300户的村落,人均参与量最高,说明达成共同管护的概率与村落规模的大小呈倒U字型关系。文章提出政策启示:要完善各类共同劳动中“搭便车”行为的惩罚机制,形成选择性激励制度;减少小农户与规模经营的农业收入差异;培育小规模村落中意识形态型制度;实现大规模村落中个人贡献可见性是实现灌溉设施共同管护的关键。

关键词: 演化博弈论, 灌溉设施, 共同管护, 集体行动, 乡村建设行动