Abstract: In the era of the knowledge economy, the regional industrial innovation and development have placed increasingly higher demands on the level of scientific and technological services. Against this background, a batch of technological service cloud platforms serving the innovative development of regional industrial clusters have emerged. These regional technological service cloud platforms need to integrate technological service resources from multiple administrative regions to enhance their spillover effects and unleash the potential value of technological resources. As the investors and owners of most technological resources, the government serves as the top-level designer, supervisor, and coordinator of the sharing mechanism of technological resources, possessing both administrative power and superior management resource advantages. Giving full play to the role of the government is conducive to promoting the sharing of regional technological resources. Therefore, studying the behavior of local governments in sharing technological resources from a micro perspective is of great significance for building a regional technological service system based on cloud platforms and advancing regional innovation and development.
This article focuses on the issue of the integration and sharing of technological service resources among local governments under the background of cloud platforms. It employs a differential game model to investigate the cross-regional integration and sharing of technological service resources promoted by local governments within a dynamic framework. Taking the allocation level of technological service resources on technological service cloud platforms as the state variable, the article proposes a coordination mechanism for government resource sharing behavior based on a two-way cost-sharing contract, considering the equilibrium results under both Nash non-cooperative game and collaborative game scenarios. Furthermore, it analyzes the impact of factors such as the scale of innovation demand and the cost of innovative enterprises joining the platform on the equilibrium results.
The research results show that: (1)The Nash non-cooperative game where local governments aim to maximize their own interests is not advisable, and a two-way cost-sharing contract can effectively coordinate the government's resource sharing behavior. (2)Compared with the Nash non-cooperative game scenario, the optimal resource sharing effort and optimal revenue of local governments under the two-way cost-sharing contract have both improved. (3)The optimal cost-sharing rate borne by the government is positively correlated with the size of local market demand, and negatively correlated with the size of competitors' market demand, the cost of enterprises joining the cloud platform, and the sensitivity coefficient of enterprises to the joining cost. (4)The cloud platform can intervene in the strategic choices of local governments by adjusting the cost of enterprises joining the platform.
The research conclusions provide theoretical support for promoting cross-regional integration and sharing of technological service resources. The study emphasizes the importance of regional technological service cloud platforms in promoting cross-regional integration and sharing of technological service resources. On one hand, it is necessary to continuously improve and perfect the basic functions of the cloud platform, such as supply-demand matching and interaction, and actively develop advanced functions such as intelligent push and service recommendations. On the other hand, measures such as adopting a reasonable fee system and providing subsidies to participating enterprises can be taken to reduce the cost of entry for innovative enterprises. The study also points out that it is crucial to coordinate the resource sharing behavior among local governments and facilitate them to reach a reasonable two-way cost-sharing contract while ensuring its implementation. Additionally, local governments need to have a thorough understanding of the market environment and set reasonable cost-sharing rates, as unreasonable rates may lead to counterproductive results.
In the future, the resource integration and sharing among multiple local governments can be further studied. Besides, the quantity and quality of technology service resources and the complementarity of resources among local governments are also important factors that affect the decision-making of local government resource sharing. The influence of these factors on optimal decision-making needs further study.

Key words: resource sharing, differential game, coordination, local government, regional science and technology services, cloud platform

摘要： 针对云平台背景下地方政府间科技服务资源集成与共享问题,运用微分博弈理论与方法探讨了Nash非合作博弈及协同合作博弈两种情形下的博弈均衡解,提出了基于双向成本分担契约的科技资源共享行为协调机制。研究结果表明:地方政府以自身利益最大化为目的的Nash非合作博弈是不可取的,采用双向成本分担契约可以有效协调政府的资源共享行为;与Nash非合作博弈情形相比,双向成本分担契约下地方政府的最优资源共享努力程度及最优收益均有所提升;政府承担的最优成本分担率与本地市场需求规模正相关,与竞争对手市场需求规模、企业加入云平台的成本及企业对加入成本的敏感系数负相关;云平台可通过调整企业加入平台的成本来干预地方政府的策略选择。

关键词: 资源共享, 微分博弈, 协调, 地方政府, 区域科技服务, 云平台