Abstract: With the development of the cultural and tourism industry and the increasingly strong demand for emotional and personalized consumption among tourists in the era of mass tourism, the contradiction between the supply and demand of cultural and tourism products is gradually becoming prominent. In order to break the bottleneck of product homogenization and strengthen brand effect, cultural and tourism enterprises will have the motivation to cooperate with IP design service providers to create cultural and tourism IP products, in order to enhance the emotional added value of the products. Considering the particularity of cultural and tourism IP products and the dynamic nature of collaborative development, it is currently an urgent challenge for enterprises involved to choose appropriate cooperation models to create and promote cultural and tourism IP products. In this context, by analyzing the IP attributes of cultural and tourism IP products, this paper characterizes the heat state equation and dynamic demand function of cultural and tourism IP products over a continuous period of time. Based on this, a supply chain for cultural and tourism IP products is constructed, and a differential game theory is used to study the dynamic development and operation strategies of cultural and tourism IP products from the perspective of internal enterprise cooperation.
This article considers the continuity of collaborative development of cultural and tourism IP products and the natural decay of product popularity. By introducing the time factor, the differential game method is dynamically applied to the decision-making of secondary supply chain cooperation in creating cultural and tourism IP products. A secondary cultural and tourism IP product supply chain composed of a single cultural and tourism enterprise and a single IP design service provider is constructed, and the optimal development decisions of both parties, the optimal trajectory of cultural and tourism IP product popularity, supply chain members, and overall optimal profits are compared and studied under two scenarios: decentralized development mode and centralized development mode. At the same time, this article proposes a “two-way cost sharing incentive mechanism” to achieve supply chain coordination and optimize the profits of supply chain members. The analysis results of this article indicate that: the optimal trajectory of the popularity of cultural and tourism IP products has monotonicity. When the popularity of ordinary products is relatively low, the popularity trajectory of cultural and tourism IP products increases monotonically over time. Otherwise, it monotonically decreases over time. In the decentralized development model, cultural and tourism enterprises will only have the incentive to share part of the development costs of IP design service providers when their profit sharing ratio is below a certain threshold. Moreover, if the profit sharing ratio of IP design service providers is too high, it will weaken the investment enthusiasm of both parties and be detrimental to an increase in product popularity. The “two-way cost sharing incentive mechanism” can establish two-way supervision between cultural and tourism enterprises and IP design service providers, incentivizing both parties to make decisions with the goal of maximizing the overall profit of the supply chain, and the proportion of two-way cost sharing is only related to the profit sharing ratio among members.
This paper only considers the cooperative development of a single cultural travel enterprise and a single IP design service provider. In real life, the development of cultural and tourism IP products may involve multiple entities, and the cooperative development of cultural and tourism IP products in complex supply chain systems needs further research. In addition, in the future, the government will be included as a game party, and the dual economic and social benefits of cultural and tourism IP products will also be considered as the next research direction.

Key words: cultural tourism IP products, product attractiveness, cooperative development, coordination contract, differential game

摘要： 基于微分博弈模型研究了由单一文旅企业和单一IP设计服务商组成的二级文旅IP产品供应链的合作开发问题。考虑到文旅IP产品热度的动态性和对市场需求的影响,对比分析了分散式和集中式开发模式下文旅企业和IP设计服务商的最优开发策略、产品热度及供应链利润,并基于此设计了“双向成本分担激励机制”以实现供应链的协调。最后,通过算例分析验证了协调机制的有效性,并分析了各参数对开发决策、产品热度和成员利润的影响。研究结果表明,文旅IP产品的热度会随着时间的推移逐渐趋于稳定。当文旅企业和IP设计服务商采取双向成本分担合作模式时,恰当的参数设置可以激励双方在产品开发上投入更多的资金和努力,打造更优质的文旅IP产品,实现利润最优。

关键词: 文旅IP产品, 产品热度, 合作开发, 协调机制, 微分博弈