Abstract: With the vigorous development of China's auto industry, by the first half of 2022, the quantity of the car in China had surpassed that in the United States and ranked first in the world, however, the market share of auto parts remanufacturing had been far lower than that in the United States. In order to promote the development of our remanufacturing industry, the government has adopted a series of incentive and subsidy policies related to remanufacturing, including both manufacturers' remanufacturing subsidies: consumers' “trading the old for the new” on the supply side and “trading the old for the remanufactured” subsidies on the demand side. In addition, with more and more consumer market segments in recent years, and the rapid development of personalized and diversified market segments, the organization of production on the supply side also needs to change. The existing literature on government subsidies considers the dual subsidies to manufacturers and consumers, but does not involve the dual subsidies that exist in both “trading the old for the new” and “trading the old for the remanufactured”, and there is a lack of research on how to implement the dual subsidies concretely. Based on the background of consumer segmentation and government dual subsidies policy, we divide government subsidy decision into subsidy ratio decision and subsidy total amount decision, and further study two different government subsidy policies and their corresponding impacts.
This paper constructs a Stackelberg game model dominated by the government, obtains the equilibrium solutions under the two kinds of subsidy decisions by a backward induction method, and explores which decision the government takes to ensure the maximization of social welfare, and how the manufacturer price their products under different government subsidy decisions to ensure their maximum profits. Then this paper studies the effects of acceptance degree of normal consumers to remanufactured products, government's attention to consumer surplus and manufacturer's profits on government subsidy decision, manufacturer pricing decision and manufacturer profits, consumer utility and social welfare by numerical analysis. The results can be summarized as follows. First, the government's subsidy ratio policy for recycling and remanufacturing of waste products is conducive to increasing social welfare and manufacturer's profits, and subsidies given to consumers for “trading the old for the new” should be at a higher rate than those for “trading the old for the remanufactured” to accelerate the recycling of products. Second, when the government implements the subsidy ratio policy, the subsidies given to the manufacturer for “trading the old for the remanufactured” are higher than those for “trading the old for the new”, which can reduce the remanufacturing cost of the manufacturer, encourage the manufacturer to carry out active remanufacturing production, and make the price advantage of remanufactured products significant, stimulating consumers to carry out green consumption, thus promoting the development of remanufacturing. Third, on the premise of effectively controlling subsidy expenditure, the government should attach importance to the share of consumer surplus and manufacturer profits in social welfare, encourage normal consumers to carry out green consumption, so that government subsidies can more effectively promote the continuation of product life cycle and the development of circular remanufacturing.
The management enlightenment is as follows: the government should focus on the implementation of the subsidy ratio policy to improve social welfare. In addition, the government should also pay attention to the share of consumer surplus and corporate profits in social welfare under the premise of effectively controlling the expenditure of subsidies. The manufacturer should adjust the prices of the two types of products according to the government's subsidy policy, so that the price advantage of remanufactured products is significant, and can promote the green behavior of consumers. Finally, normal consumers in the market should actively carry out green consumption, and cooperate with the government and the manufacturer to promote the continuation of product life cycle and the development of recycling and remanufacturing, so as to maximize social welfare. This paper only considers the remanufacturing supply chain model of the manufacturer's single-cycle direct selling. In reality, retail channels still occupy a large market share. In addition, the implementation cycle of government subsidy policies is long, so the decision considering multiple cycles is more practical. Therefore, retailers can be included in the supply chain in the future, and the government's optimal dual subsidy subdivision policy under the multi-cycle can be further studied.

Key words: remanufacturing supply chain, government dual subsidies, market segmentation, trading the old for the new, trading the old for the remanufactured

摘要： 本文考虑消费市场细分,针对政府补贴制造商进行回收再制造的同时补贴消费者进行“以旧换新”或“以旧换再”的双重补贴策略进行深入分析,通过构建政府不同补贴策略下Stackelberg博弈模型,进行补贴比例和补贴总额的两种补贴决策分析,研究实施两种不同的政府补贴策略对消费者效用和企业利润以及社会福利的影响。研究表明:政府实施单位废旧产品回收再制造补贴比例政策且补贴消费者“以旧换新”的补贴比例应高于“以旧换再”的补贴比例,可以加速产品的回收再利用;当政府实施补贴比例政策时,对制造商“以旧换再”的补贴高于“以旧换新”,可以降低制造商的再制造成本,鼓励制造商进行积极的再制造生产,使再制造产品的价格优势显著,刺激消费者进行绿色消费,从而促进再制造的发展;在有效控制补贴支出的前提下,政府应重视消费者剩余和制造商利润在社会福利中的份额,鼓励普通消费者进行绿色消费,使政府补贴更有效地促进产品生命周期的延续和循环再制造的发展。

关键词: 再制造供应链, 政府双重补贴, 市场细分, 以旧换新, 以旧换再