Abstract: The contract-farming platform is increasingly central to the digital and green transformation of modern agriculture. By enhancing traceability and transparency, blockchain technology presents a significant opportunity to add value to this model, meeting a growing consumer demand for trustworthy agricultural products. However, the widespread adoption of blockchain is confronted by a critical paradox: its potential benefits are counterweighed by blockchain energy consumption and high costs. This duality creates a complex decision-making environment for supply chain partners. Existing research has not fully addressed this challenge, particularly failing to balance economic objectives with environmental concerns under conditions of information asymmetry and fluctuating consumer trust. This paper, therefore, seeks to answer three core questions: (1)Under what specific conditions should a platform adopt blockchain technology? (2)How do key factors such as energy costs, consumer skepticism, and operational expenses influence the strategic decisions and profitability of both the platform and the farm? (3)How can the inherent conflicts of interest between the platform and the farm be effectively mitigated to achieve synergistic outcomes?
To address these questions, this paper constructs a game-theoretical framework for a two-echelon contract farming supply chain, comprising a platform and a farm. Utilizing a Stackelberg game model, we analyze and compare the optimal strategies, including pricing, carbon reduction investment, and production scale, across two scenarios: non-adoption and adoption of blockchain. The analysis moves beyond a singular focus on profit maximization to incorporate a multi-objective perspective that also considers environmental benefits, thereby offering a more comprehensive evaluation of blockchain’s systemic impact.
The results have several crucial findings. First, we identify the precise conditions for blockchain adoption, revealing that the platform’s adoption threshold is notably stricter than the farm’s preference, with energy cost emerging as the most critical determinant. When energy costs are below a specific threshold, adoption can create a “quadruple-win”, benefiting the platform, the farm, consumers, and the environment. Second, the achievement of a mutual “win-win” state for both economic and environmental goals is highly conditional, requiring not only low energy costs but also low levels of consumer skepticism towards carbon reduction efforts. Third, our model identifies a distinct zone of conflict between the platform and farm. We further propose and validate clear pathways to alleviating this conflict: improving carbon reduction technology is effective when training costs are low, while stabilizing crop yield volatility proves to be another viable strategy for enhancing cooperation and encouraging platform adoption.
This research offers significant contributions by being one of the first ones to model the impact of blockchain’s energy consumption on adoption decisions within a dual-objective contract farming framework. From a real-world perspective, this paper provides clear managerial implications. Platforms are advised to adopt low-energy consensus mechanisms and build robust certification systems to foster consumer trust. We recommend that policymakers implement a combination of short-term subsidies and long-term support for technological innovation to facilitate a smoother transition. Moreover, this paper provides a theoretical foundation and practical guidance for stakeholders to navigate the complexities of blockchain adoption, fostering a more sustainable and efficient agricultural ecosystem.

Key words: contract-farming, blockchain energy consumption, adoption decision, multiple goal

摘要： 区块链已经被用于农业数字化转型,但其高能耗和成本也为应用带来了新的挑战。本文针对区块链能耗、信息揭示以及成本多重叠加影响,分析“平台+农场”订单农业模式下平台区块链采用决策及影响。研究发现:(1)基于平台与农场利润最优目标,明确了平台采用区块链和农场偏好平台采用区块链的充分条件,当区块链能耗成本小于某一阈值时,平台采用区块链即符合自身利润目标,也会带来农场利润、消费者剩余和环境效益的增加。(2)基于利润与碳减排最优双目标,揭示了平台和农场实现利益共赢的条件,即只有区块链能耗成本在某一阈值内且消费者对碳减排投资努力水平的质疑程度低时,平台采用区块链才更有利于引导农场减排,并促成更低价格农产品的供应。(3)发现平台采用区块链下,平台和农场间存在利益冲突区域,提出缓解冲突区域的路径,即当区块链培训成本较低时,通过改进碳减排投资技术水平,平台和农场的利润和碳减排冲突区域得到缓解;但当区块链培训成本较高时,只有当碳减排投资成本系数达到一定值时,改进碳减排投资技术水平,才有利于平台采用区块链。

关键词: 订单农业, 区块链能耗, 采用决策, 多目标