Operations Research and Management Science ›› 2013, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (6): 123-131.

• Theory Analysis and Methodology Study • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Supply Chain Coordination With Wholesale Price Contract When Lateral Transshipment among Multi-retailers Exists

CHEN Jing-xian1,2, CHEN Yu2, SHI Guo-hong3   

  1. 1. School of Business, Nantong University, Nantong 226019, China;
    2. School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026;
    3. School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China
  • Received:2012-12-03 Online:2013-12-25

基于批发价契约的多零售商横向转载的供应链协调

陈敬贤1,2, 陈于1, 施国洪3   

  1. 1.南通大学 商学院,江苏 南通 226001;
    2.中国科学技术大学 管理学院,安徽 合肥 230026;
    3.江苏大学 管理学院,江苏 镇江 212013
  • 作者简介:陈敬贤(1982-),男,安徽肥东人,博士研究生,讲师,研究方向为决策分析与供应链管理;陈于(1983-),女,江苏南通人,讲师,研究方向为管理博弈分析;施国洪(1955-),男,江苏金坛人,教授/博士生导师,研究方向为管理科学与工程。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金资助项目(10CGL025);教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(11YJA870021);江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金资助项目(2010SJB630055);江苏省高校优秀青年骨干教师基金资助项目(苏教师2010第27号);南通大学百名科研创新人才培养基金(通大社科2011第8号);南通大学交通科学专项基金资助项目(11ZJ008)

Abstract: This paper studies the wholesale price contract that coordinate a supply chain under the multi-location transshipment environment. We investigate a supply chain system, which consists of one manufacturer and multi retailers. The retailers, who possibly pool their inventories to satisfy unmet demand, that is, movement of a product among the retailers. We prove that a supply chain system may be coordinated with the wholesale price contract by stochastic comparison methods, and we describe the coordinating conditions in mathematical expression. Thus, we make an analytical comparison of the optimal order quantity, wholesale price and expected revenue between the transshipment case and the non-transshipment case. Furthermore, we develope a Stackelberg game model to study the influence of transshipment policy on manufacturer's revenue. Besides, we find that a wholesale price contract may coordinate a supply chain by inducing the manufacturer to choose the whole supply chain system's best price, which corresponds to the optimal order quantity. Then, we show the coordinated conditions to this model. Numerical results show the computation and simulation results about optimal order quantity, as well as a wholesale price and expected revenue. Such conclusions demonstrate that whole sale price contract may coordinate the supply chain system with pooling retailers, and traditional double marginal effect will be mitigated because of manufacturer's rationality and retailers' rationality.

Key words: supply chain management, lateral transshipment, wholesale price contract, optimal order quantity

摘要: 研究了多零售商横向转载的供应链批发价契约协调问题。以包含一个制造商和多个零售商的供应链系统为研究对象,基于批发价契约研究了零售商转载下的供应链协调问题,获取了批发价契约可以协调零售商存在横向转载的供应链的理论证据,并给出了相应的产生供应链协调的条件,详细分析了协调情形下供应链系统最优订货量与多零售商无转载及单报童等情形下的最优订货量之间的关系。进一步研究了制造商与零售商在Stackelberg博弈下,零售商横向转载对制造商收益的影响,并提出了在Stackelberg博弈模型中,批发价契约也有可能促使制造商选择供应链系统最优订货量所对应的批发价格,使得供应链协调,且给出了此种协调产生的具体条件。数值算例则对两种供应链协调情形下的订货量、批发价格及期望收益进行了计算与仿真。研究表明,批发价契约可能会使得多零售商存在转载的供应链实现协调,传统的双重边际化效应将会由于制造商和零售商的理性而被弱化。

关键词: 供应链管理, 横向转载, 批发价契约, 最优订货量

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