Abstract: We analyze a model of oligopolistic competition of two-sided platforms with horizontally differentiated, and build a Salop model with two circles. The existence of equilibrium and the structure of equilibrium in different scales of two-sided platforms are the main points in this paper, and several results have been found. In equilibrium, the profit of two-sided platforms depends, on the aggregate and structure of prices, which are made by two-sided platforms, no matter what scales of two-sided platforms are. If there are apparently buyer markets in oligopolistic competition of two-sided platforms, buyers cannot get advantages as they get in single markets. No matter whether buyers are monopolies or in competition, equilibrium does not exist when sellers are in competition. Once there is equilibrium, two-sided platforms, buyers and sellers are all winners.

Key words: two-sided markets, salop model, cross network externality, multi-oligarch

摘要： 构建了多寡头双边平台企业竞争的Salop双环模型,研究了双边平台企业在不同规模下均衡解的存在性以及均衡解的结构。研究发现:不论双边平台企业规模如何,双边平台企业的收益不仅受平台对买卖双方制定的价格总量的影响,而且还受价格结构的影响;多寡头双边平台企业在竞争中存在明显的买方市场时,买方并不能获得类似单边市场里的主动权,且若卖方存在竞争,则无论买方是否存在竞争,均不存在均衡解;无论是买方竞争还是卖方竞争,若存在均衡解,则对双边平台企业、买方和卖方均有利,出现三方多赢的局面。

关键词: 双边市场, Salop模型, 交叉网络外部性, 多寡头