Abstract: A highway passenger transport supervision game model is formulated by using the evolutionary game theory. The behaviors choice between the bus owner of highway passenger transport and the highway passenger transport management department is analyzed. The duplicative dynamic equation of each player in this game is obtained and the evolutionary stable strategy of this game model is investigated. The relation between the evolutionary stable strategy and the parameters is analyized. It is showed that the evolutionary stable strategy of the bus owner of highway passenger transport and the highway passenger transport management department based on bounded rationality depend on the payoff of each player and the initial state of the system. Finally, some reasonable advices based on the evolutionary game model are proposed.

Key words: evolutionary game theory, evolutionary stable strategy, duplicative dynamic equation, supervision, highway passenger transport

摘要： 运用进化博弈理论研究公路客运监管问题,建立了公路客运监管问题的博弈模型,分析了公路客运车主和公路客运管理者之间的行为选择,得到了博弈方的复制动态方程,研究了博弈模型的进化稳定策略。探讨了影响进化稳定策略的因素。研究结果表明公路客运车主和公路客运管理者在有限理性基础上得到的进化稳定策略与博弈双方的收益、系统所处的初始状态有关,并根据所提出的博弈模型,提出了合理性建议。

关键词: 进化博弈论, 进化稳定策略, 复制动态方程, 监管, 公路客运