Operations Research and Management Science ›› 2018, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (7): 49-57.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2018.0157

• Theory Analysis and Methodology Study • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Influence of Forecasting Information Sharing on Dual-channel Manufacturer's Referral Strategies

GUO Qiang , LI Zeng-lu, NIE Jia-jia   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China
  • Received:2016-12-16 Online:2018-07-25

预测信息分享对双渠道制造商在线推介策略的影响

郭强, 李增禄, 聂佳佳   

  1. 西南交通大学 经济管理学院,四川 成都 610031
  • 作者简介:郭强(1970-),男,河南偃师人,博士,教授,研究方向为运营管理与决策优化分析;李增禄(1991-),男,河南宝丰人,博士研究生,研究方向为物流与供应链管理,合作广告优化分析;聂佳佳(1981-),男,河南许昌人,博士,副教授,研究方向为物流与供应链管理,决策优化分析。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(71672153);四川省哲学社会科学重点研究基地系统科学与企业发展研究中心规划项目(XQ15B06);四川省科技厅科技支撑计划项目(2015GZ0083-1);中央高校基本科研业务费资助团队项目(26816WTD01)

Abstract: The referral strategies problem of dual-channel manufacturer is studied considering the influence of retailer's forecasting information sharing. First, we establish the decision model based on the asymmetric information game theory, and then derive the equilibrium sales, wholesale price and optimal expected profit under manufacturer's different referral strategies. The results show that: when the referral market size is small, the manufacturer recommends the consumer who views the manufacturer's homepage to the official store, but when the referral market size is large, the manufacturer recommend the consumer to the official store and retailing store. At this time, the retailer has no incentives to share its forecast information with the manufacturer, thus we develop a mechanism to encourage the retailer share information with the manufacturer. Under this mechanism, if the retailer has strong negotiating power and accuracy forecast information, the referral strategy from the referral official and retailing store changes to just the referral official store.

Key words: information share, dual-channel, referral strategies, forecast accuracy

摘要: 研究了零售商预测信息分享对双渠道制造商在线推介策略的影响。运用不完全信息动态博弈建立制造商不同推介策略下供应链决策模型,得到贝叶斯均衡销量,批发价格以及各方最优预期利润。研究发现:当推介市场规模较小时,制造商仅推介官方商城;当推介市场规模较大时,制造商采取都推介策略。零售商没有动力将预测信息分享给制造商。引入信息分享补偿机制促使零售商进行信息分享,当零售商谈判能力较强且信息预测精度较高时,制造商推介策略由无信息分享下都推介转变为仅推介官方商城。

关键词: 信息分享, 双渠道, 推介策略, 预测精度

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