Abstract: Medical consumers' buying behavior is significantly affected by medical insurance regulation policy applied in the entity channel, when facing dual-channel retailing. Based on this phenomenon, a dual-channel pharmaceutical supply chain model is constructed to analyze the impacts of medical insurance regulation policy and consumer utility on supply chains performance and social welfare in this paper. This study specifically analyzes the impacts of medical insurance reimbursement ratio and commission rate charged by e-tailer on dual-channel pricing, supply chain performance and social welfare. The result shows that pharmaceutical dual-channel prices simultaneously decrease with the charge standard of e-tailer and medical insurance reimbursement ratio. It shows as well, increment in medical insurance reimbursement ratio could not only improve the social welfare, but also reduce supply chain performance. Meanwhile, the reimbursement ratio weakens low cost advantage of network channel, thus restraining channel eroding phenomenon effectively. On the other hand, increment in commission rate charged by e-tailer can improve social welfare to a certain extent, whereas it can seriously encroach total channel profit and aggravate channel competition, leading to reduction of supply chain performance.

Key words: dual-channel pharmaceutical supply chain, medical insurance regualtion, consumer utility, social welfare, pharmaceutical e-commerce

摘要： 医药消费者在面对双渠道零售时,会明显受到实体渠道医保报销政策的影响。基于这一现象,本文构建了同时考虑医保规制政策和消费者效用的双渠道医药供应链博弈模型,研究了医保报销比例和电商佣金比例对双渠道定价、供应链绩效以及社会福利的影响规律。研究结果表明:医药双渠道定价会同时随着平台收费标准和医保报销比例的增加而降低;医保报销比例的增加会提高社会福利、降低供应链绩效,同时会弱化网络渠道低价优势,能够有效抑制渠道蚕食现象;电商平台佣金比例的增加虽然在一定程度上提高了社会福利,但是会严重瓜分渠道利润,加剧渠道竞争,导致供应链绩效降低。

关键词: 双渠道医药供应链, 医保政策, 消费者效用, 社会福利, 医药电商