Analysis of an Evolutionary Game between Local Governments and Manufacturing Enterprises under Carbon Reduction Policies Based on System Dynamics

Abstract

Abstract: In order to investigate the evolutionary game relationships between local governments in China and manufacturing enterprises under carbon reduction policies, this paper analyzes their respective costs and benefits, and establishes a static mixed-strategy game model between governments and manufacturing enterprises based on the system dynamics method. It further integrates dynamic subsidy and punishment strategies by governments to examine the interaction mechanism between governments and manufacturing enterprises. The analysis result shows that subsidies and punishments on manufacturing enterprises from governments, manufacturing enterprises′ costs and benefits directly affect the game results; and three evolutionary stable strategies between governments and manufacturing enterprises exist. Under certain conditions, the evolutionary system shows the cyclical characteristics, and the mixed-strategy game model has stable Nash equilibrium when governments implement dynamic penalty strategy or dynamic compensation strategy.

Key words: carbon reduction, system dynamics, evolutionary game, dynamic strategy, local governments, manufacturing enterprise

摘要： 为探究中国在碳减排政策下地方政府与制造企业双方的博弈关系,在分析地方政府和制造企业不同策略下的成本和收益的基础上,采用系统动力学方法构建了地方政府和制造企业之间的静态混合策略演化博弈模型;进一步引入政府动态惩罚和补偿策略,剖析政企双方策略的互动机制。分析结果表明:地方政府对企业是否采取碳减排措施的奖惩力度、企业采取碳减排措施的成本与收益,会直接影响博弈结果;地方政府和制造企业两个群体在三种情况下存在演化稳定策略;在一定条件下,系统演化呈现周期性特征;当地方政府实施动态惩罚或补偿措施时,该博弈模型存在稳定的Nash均衡点。

关键词: 碳减排, 系统动力学, 演化博弈, 动态策略, 地方政府, 制造企业

CLC Number:

F205

ZHU Qing-hua, WANG Yi-lei, Tian Yi-hui. Analysis of an Evolutionary Game between Local Governments and Manufacturing Enterprises under Carbon Reduction Policies Based on System Dynamics[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2014, 23(3): 71-82.

朱庆华, 王一雷, 田一辉. 基于系统动力学的地方政府与制造企业碳减排演化博弈分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2014, 23(3): 71-82.

References

[1] US Embassy in China. The controversy over china's reported falling energy use[N]. Washington Post, 2001-8-14.
[2] Liu Y. An empirical research of awareness, behavior and barriers to enact carbon management of industrial firms in China[J]. Science of The Total Environment, 2012, 15(425):1-8.
[3] Zhao R, Neighbour G, Han J J, McGuire M, Deutz P. Using game theory to describe strategy selection for environmental risk and carbon emissions reduction in the green supply Chain[J]. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2012, 25: 927-936.
[4] 周建鹏,聂华林,张国兴,张华.低碳经济背景下企业生产策略的演化博弈分析[J].科技进步与对策,2011,28(24):88-91.
[5] 胡静锋.建设低碳经济的演化博弈分析-地方政府和企业双方互动角度[J].经济问题,2011,4:53-56.
[6] Wang R, Liu W J, Xiao L S, et al. Path towards achieving of China's 2020 carbon emission reduction target——a discussion of low-carbon energy policies at province level[J]. Energy Policy, 2011, 39(5): 2740-2747.
[7] Asafu-Adjaye J, Mahadevan R. Implications of CO₂ reduction policies for a high carbon emitting economy[J]. Energy Economics, 2013, 38: 32-41.
[8] Peters M, Fudge S, Sinclair P. Mobilising community action towards a low-carbon future: opportunities and challenges for local government in the UK[J]. Energy Policy, 2010, 12(38): 7596-7603.
[9] Price L, Wang X J, Yun J. The challenge of reducing energy consumption of the top-1000 largest industrial enterprises in China[J]. Energy Policy, 2010, 11(38): 6485-6498.
[10] Li F J, Dong S C, Li Z H, et al. The improvement of CO₂ emission reduction policies based on system dynamics method in traditional industrial region with large CO₂ emission[J]. Energy Policy, 2012, 51: 683-695.
[11] Anand S, Vrat P, Dahiya R P. Application of a system dynamics approach for assessment and mitigation of CO₂ emissions from the cement industry[J]. Journal of Environmental Management, 2006, 79: 383-398.
[12] Kunsch P, Springael J. Simulation with system dynamics and fuzzy reasoning of a tax policy to reduce CO₂ emissions in the residential sector[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2008, 185(3): 1285-1299.
[13] Kim D H. A system dynamics model for a mixed-strategy game between police and driver[J].System Dynamics Review, 1997, 13(1): 33-53.
[14] Sice P, Mosekilde E, Moscardini A, et al. Using system dynamics to analyse interactions in duopoly competition[J]. System Dynamics Review, 2000, 16(2): 113-133.
[15] Friedman D. Evolutionary games in economics[J]. Econometrica, 1991, 59(3): 637-666.
[16] Friedman D. On economic applications of evolutionary game theory[J]. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1998, 8(1): 15-43.
[17] Gintis H. Game theory evolving[M]. Second Edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
[18] Taylor P D, Jonker L B. Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamic[J]. Mathematical Bioscience, 1978, 40: 145-156.
[19] 敬篙,雷良海.利益相关者参与公司管理的进化博弈分析[J].管理科学学报,2006,9(6): 82-86.
[20] 王众托.系统工程引论[M].北京:电子工业出版社,2006.