Abstract: Demarcating the boundary of civil-military integration is the first step to optimizing the allocation of resources, stimulating the vitality of all parties, and promoting the development of civil-military integration in national defense science and technology industry. Meanwhile,institutionalizing the civil-military integration boundary ofnational defense science and technology industry has become a common practice for countries around the world to ensure the combat effectiveness of troops and improve overall social benefits. Despite in-depth research on civil-military integration in national defense science and technology industry by scholars globally, few literatures focus on the boundary issue of civil-military integration in national defense science and technology industry, and the research on it mostly stays at the qualitative level. Scientifically and systematically determining the civil-military integration boundary of national defense science and technology industry is yet not only the basic premise for the development of civil-military integration in national defense science and technology industry but also the basic standard for cooperation and sharing among all participants. Therefore, it is particularly important to use the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to demarcate the integration boundary based on the core capabilities of the participants, and take shared efficiency as the standard.
There are both common interests and conflicts among the participants of civil-military integration in national defense science and technology industry. Therefore, the key to determining the boundary of civil-military integration in national defense science and technology industry is to find a game equilibrium that can meet the needs of each subject. Moreover, since the determination of the boundary of civil-military integration in national defense science and technology industry is a dynamic process of repeated games affected by internal and external random factors, each participant conforms to the assumption of bounded rationality and will make satisfactory decision-making behaviors through repeated trial and error, learning and improvement, so the evolutionary game theory is applied to this research.
Based on the current situation, this paper uses the evolutionary game theory, takes the sharing of information and resources of national defense science and technology industry by civil and military scientific research institutions as an example, establishes the integration boundary game model, determines the boundary conditions of civil-military integration in national defense science and technology industry by analyzing the game behavior and evolution law of each participating entity, introduces the subsidy punishment mechanism for comparative analysis, and finally analyzes the game model conclusion and various influencing factors in depth based on examples. This paper responds to the contradictions and difficulties encountered in the reform and adjustment of national defense science and technology industry through a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, and solve the topic of general interest in civil-military integration theory. The results show: The civil-military integration boundary of national defense science and technology industry is determined by the riskcost, the synergistic benefit, the subsidy penalty mechanism and the initial state. At the same time, the factors that affect the cooperative stable state of the system's evolution include the total amount of complementary and sharable resources, the synergistic impact level, the cooperation risk factor and the subsidy penalty mechanism. The resource conversion and utilization level and the cooperation cost coefficient do not affect the evolution trend. The subsidy penalty mechanism can effectively promote civil-military cooperation.

Key words: national defense science and technology industry, civil-military integration boundary, evolutionary game theory

摘要： 划清军民融合边界,判断哪些领域适合军民融合发展是优化资源配置、激发军地活力、推进国防科技工业军民融合有序发展的第一步。基于国防科技工业军民融合发展现状,运用演化博弈理论,建立融合边界博弈模型,确定了国防科技工业军民融合边界条件,并引入补贴惩罚机制进行对比分析,最后结合算例对博弈模型结论和各类影响因素进行深入剖析。结果表明:国防科技工业军民融合边界由风险成本、协同收益、补贴惩罚机制和初始状态决定,同时影响系统演化合作稳定状态的因素包括互补性可分享资源总量、协同性影响水平、合作风险系数和补贴惩罚机制,资源转化利用水平和合作成本系数不影响演化趋势,并且政府的补贴惩罚机制能够有效促进军地合作。

关键词: 国防科技工业, 军民融合边界, 演化博弈