Abstract: With the rapid development of the world economy, the production mode aiming at maximizing economic benefits has gradually deteriorated the ecological environment and seriously threatened the sustainable development of human society. In this context, green technology innovation has received extensive attention from scholars and industries at home and abroad as a fundamental way to solve the dilemma between the economic development and environmental pollution. As a systematic project, green technology innovation is usually completed by multiple stakeholders. There are great differences in the interest needs of various stakeholders, and they restrict and influence each other and work together on the effect of green technology innovation. Therefore, it is particularly important to clarify the game relationship between stakeholders in green technology innovation, and the mechanism and process of game evolution. The research enriches the research results of green technology innovation and expands the depth and breadth of the theory of collaborative innovation. At the same time, it provides ideas for relevant government departments to formulate relevant policies to improve the collaborative innovation environment of green technology innovation and provides theoretical support for enterprises and research institutions to formulate cooperative innovation strategies and improve the performance of industry-university-research cooperation in green technology innovation.
Based on the stakeholder theory and evolutionary game theory, we construct a four party evolutionary game model for green technology innovation involving government, enterprises, research institutions, and the public. We analyze the influencing factors of the strategy selection of each game subject in the game system and the behavior mechanism of each subject. With replicator dynamic equations to obtain the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix for pure strategy equilibrium points, the stability of the equilibrium points in the system is analyzed based on the Lyapunov first rule. Through the simulation analysis of Matlab software, on the one hand, the above analysis results are verified, and the evolution path of the four-party game system of green technology innovation is more intuitively seen. On the other hand, the influence of key parameters such as government punishment, cost-sharing coefficient, and cooperative innovation income on the evolution process and results of the system is quantitatively investigated.
The results shows that: there are 10 conditional stable points in the 16 pure strategy equilibrium points of the evolutionary game system, among which (0,1,1,1) are the most ideal stable points of the system. According to the simulation results, it can be seen that a reasonable cost allocation mechanism is the basis for the achievement and stability of green technology collaborative innovation; the government’s appropriate increase in punishment is conducive to the achievement of collaborative innovation; the more significant the cooperative innovation income, the more conducive to the stability of the cooperation between enterprises and research institutions and the promotion of public participation in green technology innovation. Reducing the cost of public participation can promote the achievement of collaborative innovation among enterprises, research institutions, and the public. Based on the simulation results, some countermeasures and suggestions are put forward, such as establishing a reasonable cooperative cost-sharing mechanism and a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism, and establishing and improving public participation in green technology innovation channels, to provide a theoretical basis and policy reference for the development of green technology innovation in China.
Because it is difficult to obtain the relevant data on green technology innovation, the parameters in the simulation are not the actual parameters, which can only reflect the behavior trend of each subject in the evolutionary game system. Therefore, in the follow-up research, we will actively conduct an in-depth research on enterprises, universities, scientific research institutes, and other relevant units, and use real data for further research, so that the theory can be effectively combined with the application.

Key words: green technology innovation, government industry university and public, evolutionary game, simulation

摘要： “双碳”背景约束下,开展绿色技术创新已经受到了国内外学者和业界的广泛关注。基于演化博弈理论,构建政府-企业-学研机构-公众四方绿色技术创新演化博弈模型。分析博弈系统稳定策略组合及其条件,利用Matlab软件进行数值仿真,定量考察了关键参数变化对该系统演化过程与演化结果的影响。研究发现:该系统的16个纯策略均衡点中共存在10个条件稳定点,其中(0,1,1,1)为最理想稳定点。合理的成本分摊机制是绿色技术协同创新达成与稳定的基础;政府适当提高惩罚力度有利于协同创新的达成;越可观的合作创新收益越有利于企业和学研机构双方合作的稳固及推动公众参与绿色技术创新过程;降低公众参与成本能够促进企业、学研机构、公众三方协同创新的达成。最后,结合仿真结果提出对策建议,以期为中国绿色技术创新发展提供理论依据和政策参考。

关键词: 绿色技术创新, 政产学研公众, 演化博弈, 仿真