Abstract: In recent years, food safety incidents frequently occurred. This paper discusses the influence factors of farmers’ opportunistic behaviors in “company+farmer” mode based on signaling game model. Through the analysis of the basic model, it finds that the end of the game would be separate or the pooling equilibrium is determined by the hidden cost of production information. Then, in the further extended model, the sampling inspection is introduced. If the peripheral punishment can’t cover the inspection cost and the profit of low quality agricultural products, the company has no intention to inspect, or even it inspects, prohibited agricultural products still exists. Finally, it proposes some methods and countermeasures to develop the quality of agricultural products in “company+farmer” mode.

Key words: supply chain management, quality of agricultural products, signaling game, “company+farmer” mode

摘要： 针对目前食品安全事件层出不穷的现状,本文利用信号博弈模型,讨论了“公司+农户”组织模式中导致农户发生机会主义行为的影响因素。通过对基本模型的分析,发现隐瞒生产信息所需要花费的粉饰成本是影响市场出现分离均衡或混同均衡的关键因素。通过对引入抽检后的扩展模型进行分析发现,如果外围市场处罚较小,并不能覆盖低质量农产品的利润与公司检验成本之和时,那么公司进行抽检的动力不大,或者即使抽检,市场中仍旧有违禁农产品的存在。最后讨论了在“公司+农户”模式中,如何提高农产品质量的方法和措施。

关键词: 供应链管理, 农产品质量, 信号博弈, “公司+农户”模式