Abstract: We construct a completely dynamic game model to analyze the effect of demand elastic in the downstream market and countervailing power on price discrimination. The results show that the countervailing power of the retailer with low demand elastic weaken the price discrimination, and the consumer in the market with low demand elastic is better off, while the countervailing power of the retailer with high demand elastic strengthens the price discrimination, and the consumer surplus in the market with low demand elastic declines. The variation of consumer surplus in the market with high demand elastic depends on the retailer’s countervailing power, and it is improved only when the countervailing power is relatively high.

Key words: vertical relationships, price discrimination, countervailing power, demand elastic

摘要： 构建完全信息动态博弈模型,考察下游市场需求弹性、零售商抗衡势力对中间产品价格歧视的影响问题。结果表明,低弹性市场中零售商抗衡势力会削弱价格歧视,且改善低弹性市场消费者福利,而高弹性市场中零售商抗衡势力会增强价格歧视,且损害低弹性市场消费者福利。而高弹性市场消费者福利的变化则依赖于零售商的抗衡势力强度,只有当抗衡势力较强时,高弹性市场消费者福利才能够得到改善。

关键词: 纵向关系, 价格歧视, 抗衡势力, 需求弹性