Abstract: In tackling the issue of carbon emission in the context of sustainable development in China, the paper has constructed trilateral evolutionary game model of enterprises, government and environmental NGOs and its replicator dynamics equation; in the mean time, 10 break-even points has been identified and analyzed in terms of their local stability, followed by a numerical simulation regarding the evolutionary process of interactive behavior of the three parties with the assistance of Matlab. The paper also investigates how changing certain parameters may affect the results of the system, exploring the factors and mechanism which may hinder the optimization of the system. Findings of the study suggest that cost needed in carrying out low-carbon production is the major influencing factor which determines the enterprises’ choice on low-carbon production. Government's choice on whether to adopt regulatory procedures is primarily determined by the penalty posed on enterprises and the cost of implementing regulative principle. Environmental NGOs’ choice on whether to inspect is vastly dependent upon the scale of subsidy by government and by the public and the cost required for inspection.

Key words: environmental NGO, enterprise, carbon emissions, three main-bodies game

摘要： 针对我国经济可持续发展中不可回避的碳排放问题,构建了企业碳减排过程中企业、政府和环境NGO的三方演化博弈模型及其动态复制方程,解出了该模型的10个均衡点并对均衡点的局部稳定性进行了分析,最后运用Matlab工具对企业、政府和环境NGO的交互行为演化过程进行数值仿真,分析各参数变动对系统演化结果的影响,探究影响系统演化至理想状态的影响因素及其影响机理。研究结果表明:影响企业是否采取低碳生产方式的主要影响因素是企业低碳生产所需付出的成本;政府是否调控主要取决于政府对企业的罚款和政府的调控成本;环境NGO是否监督主要取决于政府和公众对其的资助与监督成本的大小。

关键词: 环境NGO, 企业, 碳排放, 三方主体博弈