Governmental Hierarchy、Institutional Environment and Investment Opportunity Based on Empirical Study of Chinese listed Company

doi:10.12005/orms.2016.0069

Operations Research and Management Science ›› 2016, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (2): 233-241.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2016.0069

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Governmental Hierarchy、Institutional Environment and Investment Opportunity Based on Empirical Study of Chinese listed Company

KONG Ting-ting^1,2, HU Wen-xiu¹

1.School of Economics and Management, Xi’an Technological University, Xi’an 710021,China;
2. The School of Business Administration, Xi’an University of Technology, Xi’an 710054

Received:2013-09-21 Online:2016-04-25

政府层级、制度环境与投资机会——基于中国上市公司的实证证据

孔婷婷^1,2,扈文秀¹

1.西安工业大学经济管理学院,陕西西安 710021;
2.西安理工大学经济管理学院,陕西西安 710054

作者简介:孔婷婷,女,讲师,博士研究生,研究方向为金融工程与投融资管理;课题负责人简介:扈文秀,男, 教授,博导,研究方向为金融工程与投融资管理。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71373204)—不同标的资产价格泡沫生成、演化的共性机理研究;教育部人文社科基金后期资助项(07JHQ0049)—资产泡沫与泡沫经济理论研究

Abstract

Abstract: This article from the perspective of government hierarchy,institutional environment and investment opportunities,in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as research samples,use factor analysis method to extract the principal component of variables to the investment opportunity set and institutional environment, and empirical test the influence of government hierarchy, institutional environment to investment opportunities. According to this research, we have discovered that there is difference influence of institutional environment to investment opportunity between government controlling corporation and non-government controlling corporation. The influence of institutional environment to government controlling corporation is notable, and these differences also exist in different hierarchy of government controlling corporation. Whether government control will affect corporation investment opportunities. Government controlling enterprises will have growth and sustainable development ability is higher than non-government controlling corporation.

Key words: governmental hierarchy, institutional environment, investment opportunity, government control

摘要： 本文从政府层级、制度环境与投资机会的角度出发,运用因子分析方法,对投资机会集、制度环境变量提取了主成分,以2005~2009年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了政府层级、制度环境对投资机会的影响。研究发现:制度环境对政府控制公司和非政府控制公司的投资机会影响不同,对政府控制公司影响显著;且不同层级的政府控制企业影响程度也有差异;政府是否控制会对企业投资机会产生影响:省政府是否控制在1%的水平下对企业的投资机会具有显著的正向影响,市政府是否控制在5%的水平下对企业的投资机会具有显著的正向影响,中央政府和县政府是否控制对企业的投资机会影响并不显著;政府控制企业会比非政府控制企业获得更高的成长性和可持续发展能力。

关键词: 政府层级, 制度环境, 投资机会, 政府控制

CLC Number:

F812.2

KONG Ting-ting, HU Wen-xiu. Governmental Hierarchy、Institutional Environment and Investment Opportunity Based on Empirical Study of Chinese listed Company[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2016, 25(2): 233-241.

孔婷婷,扈文秀. 政府层级、制度环境与投资机会——基于中国上市公司的实证证据[J]. 运筹与管理, 2016, 25(2): 233-241.

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Governmental Hierarchy、Institutional Environment and Investment Opportunity Based on Empirical Study of Chinese listed Company

政府层级、制度环境与投资机会——基于中国上市公司的实证证据

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