Analysis of Evolutionary Game between Logistics Enterprises and Banks Based on Warehouse Receipts Financing

doi:10.12005/orms.2018.0108

Abstract

Abstract: A good cooperation relationship between the bank and logistics company is the premise and the basic condition for continual development of logistics financial business. In this paper, we analyze the supervision and shielding problem between bank and the logistics company based on the evolutionary game theory considering the warehouse receipts financing. Moreover, it provides a theoretical basis for establishing a good cooperation relationship according to the evolutionary procedure and evolutionary result with the replicator dynamics equations and the phase diagram. The results show that the system’s evolutionary direction is influenced by the players’ payoff and system’s initial status. Moreover, the key factors that affect the system’s evolutionary result, the bank’s supervision cost, the bank's earnings losses, the logistics company’s shielding cost and the fine of logistics company are researched in this paper. Furthermore, the external force will promote the desired evolutionary stable strategy(not shielding, not supervising).

Key words: warehouse receipts financing, cooperation, evolutionary equilibrium, evolutionary stable strategy

摘要： 物流企业与银行之间的良好合作关系是物流金融业务继续发展的前提和基础。以仓单质押融资业务为例,运用演化博弈理论对物流企业与银行之间的监督包庇问题进行了分析,构建复制动态方程和运用动态相位图分析群体策略的演化过程及结果,为建立良好的合作关系提供理论依据。分析结果表明:该动态系统的演化方向受到博弈支付矩阵以及系统的初始状态的影响。银行监督成本、银行的收益损失、物流企业的包庇成本和物流企业的罚金是影响演化结果的关键性因素。通过外部力量的加入,可促使系统演化至(不包庇,不监督)这一期望演化稳定策略。

关键词: 仓单质押, 合作, 演化均衡, 演化稳定策略

CLC Number:

F224.32

CHAI Zheng-meng, DUAN Li-li. Analysis of Evolutionary Game between Logistics Enterprises and Banks Based on Warehouse Receipts Financing[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2018, 27(5): 31-39.

柴正猛, 段黎黎. 基于仓单质押融资的物流企业与银行的演化博弈分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2018, 27(5): 31-39.

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