Abstract: Starting from revenue expectation of contracting parties within agreement, the paper establishes a cooperative game theory model to study the internal motivation and stability of international cooperation governance in climate negotiations. The conclusion shows that cooperative agreement can help heterogeneous countries to increase the revenue of greenhouse gas emission reduction governance, and the internal motivation for the formation of cooperation agreements among countries participating in climate negotiations is the expected distribution of the net cooperation revenue. However, this internal motivation cannot make the cooperation agreement achieve equilibrium, equilibrium realization is a process of adjusting the internal distribution policy of expected net revenue: when some negotiating participants withdraw from the cooperative alliance as the most powerful threat, no one can gain more utility without causing losses when the alliance collapses, which makes the negotiating participants form a stable state in mutual checks and balances. The research contribution of the paper lies in breaking through the inherent non-cooperative game framework, explaining the cooperation mechanism of climate negotiation among heterogeneous countries at a more general level, and helping countries to take effective measures to establish climate cooperation alliance to cope with climate challenges.

Key words: international climate negotiations, cooperation agreement, internal motivation, stability, cooperative game

摘要： 通过建立国际气候谈判的合作博弈理论模型,从协议内部缔约国收益预期出发,研究气候谈判国际合作治理的内在动因与稳定性。结论表明:合作协议有助于异质性国家间增加温室气体减排治理带来的收益,参与气候谈判的国家间形成合作协议的内在动因,正是对合作净收益的预期分配;而这种内在动因并不能使合作协议达到均衡,均衡的实现过程,是对预期净收益的内部分配政策的调整过程:当部分谈判参与国以退出合作联盟作为最有力威胁,没有任何一方能在联盟瓦解时,在不造成损失的情况下获得效用的增加,这就使谈判参与国在相互制衡中形成稳定状态。研究贡献在于突破了固有的非合作博弈框架,在更为一般层面上解释了异质性国家间的气候谈判合作机理,有助于各国采取有效措施建立气候合作联盟,应对气候挑战。

关键词: 国际气候谈判, 合作协议, 内在动因, 稳定性, 合作博弈