Abstract: This paper analyzes the preference of PM_2.5 governance strategies from the perspective of central and local governments by comprehensively considering the impact of PM_2.5 on asymmetric cross-border transmission between regions, and the synergistic effect of PM_2.5 governance on people, businesses, and governments. The results show that: the removal of cooperation and non-cooperation is not the same all the time due to the influence of transboundary transmission factors. There is no difference between the cost of cooperation and non-cooperation when the amount of cooperation and non-cooperation between regions is the same; otherwise, the cost of cooperation is lower than that of non-cooperation. With the reduction(increase)of cross-border transmission factors between regions, the cost gap between cooperative and non-cooperative governance is reduced(increased), and governments at all levels are more inclined to non-cooperative governance(the central government may wish to cooperate). The emission reduction target setting should consider the difference in returns between cooperation and non-cooperation, as well as the impact of factors such as the level of economic development.

Key words: PM_2.5 control, cooperative game, cross-boundary transmission factors, Shapley value

摘要： 本文以京津冀雾霾治理为例,综合考虑了PM_2.5在地区间的非对称性跨界传输影响、PM_2.5治理对民众、企业、政府带来的协同效应。从中央与地方政府视角对比分析了减排指标约束下利益各方的PM_2.5治理策略偏好。研究表明:由于跨界传输因子的影响,合作与非合作时污染物的去除量不一定相等。当各地合作与非合作污染物去除量相等时,合作与非合作成本无差异;否则,合作成本优于非合作,而合作成本的降低源于总体减排量减少。如果跨界传输因子增大或减小,合作与非合作治理的成本差距相应地会增加或减小,各地方政府合作治理意愿会逐渐增大或减小;而中央政府可能更希望地方政府在完成减排指标时能尽可能多减排,因此倾向于地方政府采取非合作治理。减排指标设置时应考虑合作与非合作时收益差异,以及各地经济发展水平等因素的影响。

关键词: PM_2.5治理, 合作博弈, 跨界传输因子, Shapley值