Abstract: The research and development of industrial core technology has the characteristics with large investment, long period, and difficult breakthrough. It needs to take the path of multi-subject participation, multi-level interest balance and step-by-step technology breakthrough. Based on this, the principal-agent game model between “government-enterprise” and the multi-party cooperative game model between “government-enterprise-academic research institution” are constructed respectively based on the different stages of industrial peripheral technology development and core technology breakthrough. By solving the model and making use of numerical simulation, the profit-loss relationship between the players and the key factors affecting their behaviors are analyzed. Thispaper demonstrates that the main factors affecting the development of peripheral technology include the level of innovation efforts of enterprises, government incentives, risk aversion of enterprises and the degree of information asymmetry between government and enterprises, while the main factors affectingcoretechnology breakthroughs include government incentives, innovation costs ofindustry-university-researchcooperation, the probability of technology to achieve breakthrough methods, etc. Correspondingly, the strategies at different stages should also be designed around the above factors.

Key words: technical breakthrough, principal-agent, cooperative game, multi-level equalization

摘要： 产业核心技术研发具有“投入大、周期长、突破难”的特点,需走多主体参与、多级利益均衡、递阶式技术突破之路。基于此,立足产业外围技术发展和核心技术突破不同阶段,分别构建了“政府-企业”间的委托-代理博弈模型以及“政府-企业-学研机构”间的多方合作博弈模型;通过模型求解和数值仿真,分析各方博弈主体的损益关系以及影响其行为的关键因素。研究表明,影响外围技术发展的主要因素有企业的创新努力水平、政府激励、企业的风险规避度以及政企之间信息不对称的程度等,而影响核心技术突破的主要因素有政府激励、产学研创新费用、技术实现突破方式的概率等,相应地,不同阶段的对策与策略也应重点围绕上述因素进行设计。

关键词: 技术突破, 委托代理, 合作博弈, 多级均衡