Abstract: In view of the default problems between company and farmers, this paper builds the “company+farmer” leasing model based on the principal-agent theory, which is made up of the risk averse company and farmers. Setting strategy of the incentive coefficient and rent of the model is analyzed under the condition of asymmetric information. The impact of parameter change on the incentive coefficient and rent is discussed through the numerical simulation. The research results show that the higher the sharing ratio of the company to the farmers, the higher the level of farmers’ production effort. Meanwhile, the lower the rent paid by the company to the farmers in the early stage, the higher the sharing ratio to the farmers latter. In addition, the incentive coefficient increases with the increase of the company’s risk aversion coefficient and the farmers' production capacity, and decreases with the increase of the farmers’ risk aversion coefficient and the exogenous uncertain factors. The rent increases with the farmers’ risk aversion coefficient and production capacity, and decreases with company’s the risk aversion coefficient and exogenous uncertain factors. Moreover, there exist optimal market prices that make the rent lowest.

Key words: company+farmer, leasing model, principal-agent theory, information asymmetry, incentive mechanism

摘要： 针对公司与农户合作时存在违约问题,本文基于委托代理理论构建了由风险规避的公司和农户组成的“公司+农户”租赁模型。分析了在信息不对称条件下,该模式的激励系数与租金的制定策略,并通过数值仿真探讨了各参数变化对激励系数和租金的影响。研究结果表明公司给予农户的分成比例越高,农户生产努力水平越高,同时公司前期支付给农户的租金越低,后期给予农户的分成比例越高。此外,激励系数随公司风险规避系数、农户生产能力的增加而增加,随农户风险规避系数、外生不确定因素的增加而减小;租金随农户风险规避系数、农户生产能力的增加而增加,随公司风险规避系数、外生不确定因素的增加而减小,并且在满足一定条件时,存在最优的市场价格使得租金最低。

关键词: 公司+农户, 委托代理, 租赁, 信息不对称, 激励机制