Abstract: This paper studies the supply chain combined contract design under supply and demand uncertainty with bilateral efforts. We consider a secondary supply chain system consisting of a supplier and a retailer, in which the supplier’s efforts influence the uncertainty of production and the retailer’s efforts influence the uncertainty of market demand. Firstly, by means of the Stackerberg Game Model, the optimal profit of the retailer and supplier is calculated under decentralized decision making and compared with the optimal profit of supply chain under centralized decision-making.Because of the dual marginal effect, the overall profit of the decentralized supply chain is less than that of the centralized. Based on that, this paper designs the buy-back and cost-sharing combined contract to coordinate the supply chain, derives the expression of repurchase price and cost-sharing coefficient and obtains the optimal expected profit of suppliers and retailers. The results show that the combined contract can not only coordinate the supply chain, but also can distribute the supply chain profit arbitrarily under certain conditions. Finally, the decision variables and expected profit of both parties are analyzed through numerical calculation.

Key words: supply and demand uncertainty, bilateral efforts, supply chain, combined contract

摘要： 本文研究供需同时不确定条件下考虑双边努力的供应链契约设计问题,在一个供应商和一个零售商组成的二级供应链系统中,供应商的努力影响产量的不确定性,零售商的努力影响市场需求的不确定性。首先,利用Stackerberg主从博弈模型计算了分散决策时零售商、供应商的最优期望利润,并将计算结果与集中决策时供应链整体的最优期望利润进行对比。由于双重边际效应的存在,分散决策时供应链的最优期望利润小于集中决策时供应链的最优期望利润。基于此,本文设计了回购和成本分担组合契约来协调该供应链,计算了回购价格和成本分担系数的表达式,得到了回购和成本分担契约下供应商和零售商的最优期望利润。结果表明,在特定条件下,该组合契约不仅可以协调供应链,还可以实现供应链利润的任意分配。最后,通过数值计算,分析了供需双方的决策变量和期望利润随契约参数的变化情况。

关键词: 供需不确定, 双边努力, 供应链, 组合契约