KIBS员工需求驱动下行为决策的模拟——基于风险偏好视角

doi:10.12005/orms.2015.0014

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 随着经济全球化的发展,知识密集型服务业(KIBS)越来越受到学术界的关注。本文研究员工的风险偏好对KIBS员工合作与冲突行为的影响演化规律,目的在于为KIBS的管理决策提供支持。为了发现风险偏好对员工合作与冲突行为的影响,设计效用函数,并建立了风险规避和风险中性下KIBS员工合作与冲突行为决策模型,给出了KIBS员工在不同风险假定下的最优行为决策,对风险规避员工组织应当给予适度的激励,这样能够提高员工的合作程度。之后使用MATLAB2010进行模拟,并使用EXCEL对数据进行分析,发现:(1)风险偏好程度不同对员工的决策行为的影响程度不同;(2)对于员工应该给予适当的激励措施,以便提高员工的合作程度;(3)当任务的工作量达到一定程度,应当增加的是员工的固定收益而不是激励程度。

关键词: 风险偏好, 激励程度, 知识密集型服务业, 合作与冲突, 行为运作

Abstract: With the development of economic globalization, more and more academics are focused on knowledge-intensive service(KIBS). In order to provide support management decisions for the KIBS ,this paper studies the evolutionary law of KIBS employees’ cooperation and conflict behavior when effected by the risk preference. We develop a behavior decision model of KIBS employees’ cooperation and conflict and employee incentive model, design utility function considering the risk neutral and risk aversion of employee. Organization should give different appropriate incentives for different risk preference employees, which can improve the staff’s cooperation. Then MATLAB2010 and EXCEL are used to implement this simulation analysis.The simulation results show that: 1)Different degrees of risk preference have different impacts on the decision-making behavior of employees;2)In order to improve the staff’s cooperation, organization should give appropriate incentives for employees; 3)When the task of the work load reaches a certain degree, organization should increase the staff’s fixed income rather than the degree of motivation.

Key words: risk appetite, degree of incentive, knowledge intensive business services(KIBS), cooperation and conflict, behavioral operations

中图分类号:

姜凤珍, 胡斌. KIBS员工需求驱动下行为决策的模拟——基于风险偏好视角[J]. 运筹与管理, 2015, 24(1): 100-107.

JIANG Feng-zhen, HU bin. Simulation for the KIBS Employee Behavior Decision-making in Demand-driven ——Based on the Perspective of Risk Appetite[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2015, 24(1): 100-107.

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