关键词: 均值-条件风险价值, 收益共享契约, 供应链协调

Abstract: Revenue sharing contract can effectively improve the operation efficiency of the supply chain. In practice,the member of the supply chain is risk neutral, disgust, and risk preferences.This paper studies the coordination problems of revenue sharing contract of supply chain, in which supply chain memberships are risk-taking, risk-neutral or risk-averse, using the M-CVaR theory. First we establish M-CVaR model of retailers and supply chain based on the revenue sharing contract, and then research the coordination problems of revenue sharing contract of supply chain. Finally, we study the impacts of risk preference level of supply chain members on optimal order quantity and the wholesale prices.After obtaining the corresponding relationship, the authors validate the theoretical results through a numerical example. The results show that the optimal wholesale price decreases with the increasing of retailer’s coefficient of pessimism and increases with the rise in supplier’s coefficient of pessimism. The optimal order quantity decreases with the rise in coefficient of pessimism of retailer and supplier. Therefore,the design of revenue sharing contract of supply chain should consider the risk preference level of the members.

Key words: mean conditional value at risk(M-CVaR), revenue sharing contract, supply chain coordination