运筹与管理 ›› 2017, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (5): 89-94.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2017.0113

• 理论分析与方法探讨 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于进化博弈的猪肉供应链质量投入决策机制研究

孙世民, 张园园   

  1. 山东农业大学 经济管理学院,山东 泰安 271018
  • 收稿日期:2015-04-06 出版日期:2017-05-25
  • 作者简介:孙世民(1962-),男,山东莒县人,管理学博士,教授,博士生导师,主要研究方向:畜产品供应链管理。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金资助项目(15BGL136)

Study on the Quality Input Decision-making Mechanism in Pork Supply Chain Based on the Evolutionary Game

SUN Shi-min, ZHANG Yuan-yuan   

  1. School of Economy and Management, Shandong Agricultural University, Taian 271018, China
  • Received:2015-04-06 Online:2017-05-25

摘要: 养殖和屠宰加工是决定猪肉质量安全状况的两个关键环节。本文运用双种群进化博弈模型研究了猪肉供应链中养猪场与屠宰加工企业质量投入决策机制。研究结果表明:养猪场和屠宰加工企业质量投入策略的选择与其质量投入收益率密切相关。当单方质量投入收益率较小时,政府应采取补贴措施,激励养猪场或屠宰加工企业进行质量投入;当单方质量投入收益率较大且双方质量投入收益率较小时,养猪场和屠宰加工企业均有“搭便车”行为,政府应采取惩罚措施,迫使其进行质量投入。

关键词: 供应链管理, 质量投入, 进化博弈, 决策机制, 猪肉

Abstract: Breeding and slaughter processing are the two key links to determine pork quality and safety condition. In this paper the quality input decision-making mechanism of pork supply chains is analyzed with the bi-group evolutionary strategy optimization grey model. The results prove that, the choices of pig farms and slaughter processing enterprises on quality input strategy are closely related to the return. The government should provide subsidies to inspire pig farms or slaughter processing enterprises to carry on quality input in case that the unilateral yield of quality input is lower. The “free rider” appears on the pig farms and slaughter processing enterprises in case that the unilateral yield of quality input is higher and the bilateral yield of quality input is lower. The punitive measures should be taken to force the pig farms or slaughter processing enterprises to carry on quality input.

Key words: supply chain management, quality input, evolutionary game, decision-making mechanism, pork

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