考虑消费者低碳偏好的供应链企业减排成本分摊比较研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2017.0235

运筹与管理 ›› 2017, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (10): 65-73.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2017.0235

考虑消费者低碳偏好的供应链企业减排成本分摊比较研究

李友东¹, 谢鑫鹏²

1.内蒙古大学经济管理学院,内蒙古呼和浩特 010021;
2.军事交通学院军用车辆系,天津 300161;

收稿日期:2016-11-04 出版日期:2017-10-25
作者简介:李友东(1978-),男,内蒙古巴彦淖尔市人,讲师,博士,研究方向:供应链管理,低碳经济,决策管理。
基金资助:
内蒙古自然科学基金项目(2015MS0709);内蒙古大学高层次人才引进科研启动计划资助项目(135144)

Research on Carbon Abatement Cost Allocation Comparison of Supply Chain Enterprises Considering the Low-corbon Preference of the Consumers

LI You-dong¹, XIE Xin-peng²

1.School of Economics and Management, Inner Mongolia University, Hohhot 010021, China;
2.Military Transport University, Tianjin 300161, China;

Received:2016-11-04 Online:2017-10-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在低碳环境下,研究了单一制造商和单一零售商组成的两级低碳供应链成本分摊决策问题。考虑消费者具有环保意识,因此在购买产品时会考虑产品的碳排放。分别讨论了零售商参与减排成本分摊契约和双方Nash讨价还价成本分摊契约两种形式对碳减排、产品定价和整个供应链及其成员收益的影响。研究发现,在两种契约形式中,零售商都可以实现与制造商共同降低碳排放的目标,从而促进制造商提高碳减排率,提高供应链利润。但是基于Nash讨价还价方式的减排成本分摊契约的供应链绩效高于零售商成本分摊契约下的供应链绩效。同时消费者低碳偏好增加可以激励零售商更多地分摊减排成本,在此基础上,利用Nash讨价还价模型确定了零售商为制造商提供减排成本分摊的比例范围及其最优解。最后,通过数值分析验证了减排因子对不同决策结构的定价、零售商减排分摊比例、供应链利润等决策的影响。

关键词: 低碳偏好, 低碳供应链, 成本分摊契约, 纳什讨价还价

Abstract: Under the low-carbon environment, we focus on a dyadic low-carbon supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer to develop a game model for studying the issues of carbon emission reduction.The consumers are assumed to be of low-carbon preference and accordingly will note the carbon emission of product when shopping. This paper studies the impact of two models of cost sharing-one in which the retailer offers a cost sharing contract and the other in which the retailer and manufacturer bargain on the cost sharing contract on carbon emission reduction, prices and channel profits.We find that with the cost-sharing and Nash bargaining cost sharing contract, the retailer can achieve the goal of reducing carbon emissions together with manufacturer, so as to promote manufacturer to improve carbon emissions, accordingly will improve supply chain profit. However, the supply chain performance of Nash bargaining cost sharing contract is higher than that of the retailer’s cost sharing contract. At the same time, the increase of consumers’ low carbon preference can encourage retailer to allocate the cost of emission reduction,and how to determine the carbon abatement cost sharing ration is analyzed with the Nash bargaining model. Finally, the influence of the emission reduction factors on the pricing, the amortization ratio of retailer’s emission reduction and profit of the supply chain of different decision structures are verified by numerical analysis.

Key words: low-carbon preference, low-carbon supply chain, cost sharing contract, nash bargaining

中图分类号:

F274

李友东, 谢鑫鹏. 考虑消费者低碳偏好的供应链企业减排成本分摊比较研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2017, 26(10): 65-73.

LI You-dong, XIE Xin-peng. Research on Carbon Abatement Cost Allocation Comparison of Supply Chain Enterprises Considering the Low-corbon Preference of the Consumers[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2017, 26(10): 65-73.

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考虑消费者低碳偏好的供应链企业减排成本分摊比较研究

Research on Carbon Abatement Cost Allocation Comparison of Supply Chain Enterprises Considering the Low-corbon Preference of the Consumers

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