运筹与管理 ›› 2016, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (1): 126-132.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2016.0017

• 理论分析与方法探讨 • 上一篇    下一篇

运输问题的合作对策求解方法

徐屹嵩1, 王应明2   

  1. 1.青岛大学 商学院,山东 青岛 266071;
    2.福州大学 经济与管理学院,福建 福州 350108
  • 收稿日期:2013-05-23 出版日期:2016-02-25
  • 作者简介:徐屹嵩,男,博士,讲师,主要研究方向:运筹学、博弈论;王应明,男,教授,工学博士,国家基金委长江学者特聘教授,国家杰出青年科学基金获得者,博士生导师,研究领域:决策理论与方法,数据包络分析(DEA),规则库和人工神经网络。
  • 基金资助:
    国家杰出青年科学基金:决策理论与方法(70925004)

Cooperative Game Method of the Transportation Problem

XU Yi-song1, WANG Ying-ming2   

  1. 1.School of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China;
    2. School of Economics and management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350108, China;
    2.School of Public Administration, Fuzhou University,Fuzhou 350108, China
  • Received:2013-05-23 Online:2016-02-25

摘要: 产地间或销地间往往存在竞争,在这种情况下,使用运输问题最优化方法是不合理的。因此,从个体理性的视角提出运输问题的合作对策求解方法,方法将运输问题看作是一个博弈问题,各个产地或销地是博弈的局中人,求解其纳什均衡与纳什讨价还价解。在此基础上,说明了运输问题的非合作形式是一个指派问题,并证明指派问题的最优解是一个纳什均衡点。接着,通过实验验证运输问题的最优解是一个纳什讨价还价解,满足产地或销地的自身利益。在此基础上,针对纳什讨价还价解不唯一的问题,从决策者的视角给出最大可能激励成本的计算方法。最后,为弥补纳什讨价还价解不唯一及纳什讨价还价解不允许出现子联盟的缺陷,给出运输收益分配或成本分摊的Shapely值计算方法。

关键词: 运输问题, 博弈论, 纳什均衡, 纳什讨价还价解, Shapely值

Abstract: In case where there is a competition among the sources(warehouses or suppliers)or destinations(demand points or consumers), in this situation, using the traditional method to solve the problem may be seen as undesirable and unfair. Specifically, each source or destination is viewed as a player that seeks to maximize its own efficiency or minimize its own cost. To address this issue, the transportation problem is solved with the game theory in the first time, and its Nash equilibrium and Nash bargaining solution is proposed. The virtual transportationproblem in the non-cooperate situation is the assignment that each person pursues the most efficient task to his own benefit. Most importantly, the Nash equilibrium of the assignment problem is also the Nash equilibrium of the transportation problem. Based on the Nash equilibrium of the transportation problem, the Nash bargaining model of the transportation problem is proposed, and it is showed that the optimal solution constitutes a Nash bargaining solution with experiments. Because the Nash bargaining model may have more than one solution, we propose an evaluation method to calculate the decision maker’s expected monitoring cost. Finally, its Shapely value is discussed.

Key words: transportation problem, game, nash equilibrium, nash bargaining solution, shapely value

中图分类号: