关键词: 供应链协调, 公平偏好, 奖励惩罚契约, 质量水平

Abstract: The paper aims at the insufficiency that the traditional bonus-penalty contract based on quantitative criteria cannot adapt to the current demand characteristics of many varieties and small batch and coordinate the supply chain. In the context of fairness preference, this paper builds the bonus-penalty contract based on the product quality criteria provided by suppliers,to study how the contract influences the coordination of supply chain. Assuming the retailer is fairness preferred in the two-echelon supply chain with a manufacturer and a supplier, the paper analyzes two situations, namely, the same and different channel power of supply chain participants. We find that the suppliers and retailers will cooperate in accordance with the contract , get a balanced result and achieve supply chain coordination, when the retailer has the same degree of concern for own income and fairness. Furthermore, the difference of channel power will much affect supply chain overall profit. Finally, a numerical example is given to demonstrate the model.

Key words: supply chain coordination, fairness preference, bonus-penalty contract, quality level