关键词: 制造商入侵, 店中店, 促销努力, 消费者分类, Hotelling模型

Abstract: In this paper, we study a new entrant manufacturer’s optimal invasion mode and the product promotion decisions by the Hotelling model under a duopoly market environment. The incumbent exists in the market with the store-within-a-store mode and the new entrant first needs to choose his invasion mode between the traditional wholesale mode and the store-within-a-store mode. Then the new entrant also needs to decide whether to take the product promotion. The results show that different encroachment strategies affect new entrant’s promotion decision. Revenue sharing ratio in the store-within-a-store mode is the main factor affecting the entrant’s mode selection. When this ratio is low, the entrant tends to choose the store-within-a-store mode. Finally, the impacts of revenue sharing ratio and product differentiation on members’ performance is analyzed by numerical experiments.

Key words: manufacturer encroachment, store-within-a-store, sales effort, consumer segement, Hotelling model