关键词: 对外直接投资, 跨国并购, 生产率差异, Hotelling模型, 演化均衡

Abstract: Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper investigates, from the perspective of firm heterogeneity, the influence mechanism of the difference in total factor productivity between the two parties of cross-border M&A on the enterprises’ OFDI entry strategy selection, when they go global through OFDI. The Hotelling model is used to construct the OFDI entry strategy game model of capital-intensive enterprises and labor-intensive enterprises, and discuss the variation process of enterprises’ OFDI entry mode decision under the change of productivity difference between the two parties of M&A. Our results show that when the productivity difference between the two parties of cross-border M&A is small, the market reaches an evolutionary stable state: both types of enterprises tend to choose the cross-border M&A strategy; When the productivity difference between the two parties becomes larger, the density and structure of enterprises’ production factor play an important role in the decision-making of their OFDI entry mode choices, and the capital-intensive enterprises with higher knowledge or technology intensity and some labor-intensive enterprises with strong competitiveness still prefer cross-border M&A strategy, while the rest of labor-intensive enterprises choose green-field investment mode to enter the international market. This implicates that the enterprises’ OFDI entry strategy choices differ due to the different density and structure of production factors in the industry which they belong to. To some extent, our findings contribute to the existing related literature, and provide a certain theoretical reference for the future research on this topic.

Key words: outward foreign direct investment, cross-border M&A, productivity difference, Hotelling model, evolutionary equilibrium