关键词: 下侧风险规避, B2B平台, 收益分配比例, 损失补偿比例, 激励策略

Abstract: Taking electronic warehouse receipt financing as an example, which is based on bank’s downside risk aversion, this paper applies the principal-agent theory to study the incentive strategy design of banks for B2B platforms when B2B platforms have hidden moral risks under the joint credit mode and the entrusted credit mode. The study finds that the optimal effort level of B2B platform decreases with the increase of income distribution ratio and repurchase ratio, and increases with the increase of pledge rate, loan interest rate, product purchase quantity and loss compensation ratio. At the same time, in order to avoid default risks, banks need to set the upper limit of pledge rate, loan interest rate and loan amount and the lower limit of repurchase ratio. What’s more, the bank’s optimal income distribution ratio is positively correlated with the loss compensation ratio, and the optimal loss compensation ratio is also positively correlated with the loan loss rate. In addition, with the improvement of working efficiency of B2B platform, the optimal income distribution ratio will be reduced and the optimal loss compensation ratio will be increased under the joint credit mode, and finally the optimal loss compensation ratio will be similar to the optimal loss compensation ratio which is under the entrusted credit mode. At last, a numerical analysis is given.

Key words: downside risk aversion, B2B platform, income distribution ratio, loss compensation ratio, incentive strategy