关键词: 协作型努力, 农业产业化联盟, 绩效激励, 利益分配

Abstract: Agricultural industrialization alliances, formed by a diverse array of agricultural operators through contractual agreements, have emerged as a significant organizational model driving agricultural development in the new era. However, in practice, the phenomenon of alienation within these agricultural alliances is frequently observed. This includes issues such as the club-like nature of member organizations, the de-familization of primary operators, and excessive scaling that effectively marginalizes small farmers. Such trends severely deviate from the central government’s policy vision for establishing a modern agricultural management system and achieving strategic goals related to rural revitalization. The underlying cause of these challenges lies in the absence of an effective benefit-sharing mechanism among stakeholders within the agricultural alliance that fosters continuous improvement in agricultural performance. Consequently, this study aims to explore the design of a rational performance incentive mechanism to promote cooperative participating behavior among farmers in these alliances. Establishing a novel cooperation framework that facilitates interest sharing and mutual benefits between primary operators and farmers is crucial for stimulating endogenous motivation toward autonomous alliances among various stakeholders engaged in agricultural land management.
To maximize the performance output of agricultural industrialization alliances and optimize the distribution of benefits among agricultural land operators, this study utilizes agency theory to examine the incentive-related issues associated with the performance of an agricultural industrialization alliance comprising a new type of agricultural operator and multiple farmers. The production efforts exerted by farmers are classified into self-interested efforts and altruistic (cooperative) efforts. A performance incentive mechanism model based on total alliance performance output (UA) is developed alongside an incentive model focused on individual farmer performance (NA). These models are subsequently solved, a sensitivity analysis is made and numerical simulations to assess the results are derived from these models.
The results show that: (1)The effects of the UA and NA incentive mechanisms will be influenced only when the performance threshold set by agricultural regulatory authorities exceeds the threshold determined by equilibrium performance output, allowing the government to guide the behavior of agricultural industrialization alliances through this “target incentive” directive. (2)In low reserve performance scenarios, the two types of farmers’ effort levels, the personal performance incentive coefficient, the alliance performance incentive coefficient, and the total alliance performance output are positively correlated with the effort-performance conversion rate and negatively correlated with the risk aversion factor, while in high reserve performance scenarios, the opposite relationships are observed. (3)Compared to the NA incentive mechanism, the UA incentive mechanism effectively enhances farmers’ enthusiasm for cooperative production and fosters strong cohesion within the alliance. This is conducive to achieving a higher balanced performance output, thereby enabling new agricultural business entities to realize positive economic value benefits. Simultaneously, it stimulates internal motivation among diverse interests related to agricultural land, promoting performance improvement, benefit-sharing, and coordinated development within the agricultural industrialization alliance.
Based on the aforementioned conclusions, the managerial implications are as follows: (1)New entities should be actively guided to establish a comprehensive performance incentive mechanism grounded in a “cooperative” agricultural alliance, thereby fostering collaborative enthusiasm among participating farmers. (2)The government’s “target incentive” directive serves as a guiding framework for influencing the behavior of agricultural alliances, promoting sustainable and high-quality agricultural development while stabilizing alliance performance outputs and mitigating uncertainties faced by farmers. (3)Utilizing performance metrics established by regulatory authorities, we can evaluate the number of farmers engaged in the “collaborative” agricultural alliance to achieve optimal total performance output. This strategy aims to facilitate new entities in realizing positive economic value gains.
Future research may focus on analyzing farmer heterogeneity, examining incentive mechanisms when the new agricultural operator and farmers have different risk preferences, and empirically testing the conclusions drawn from the agency theory framework.

Key words: collaborative effort, agricultural industrialization alliance, performance incentive, benefit distribution