关键词: 文旅景区, 旅行社, 在线旅游平台, 四方博弈, 合作演化

Abstract: Travel agencies and online travel platforms are important partners with cultural tourism scenic spots. Currently, both of them take a large share of China's travel market. The operations of cultural tourism scenic spots, travel agencies and online travel platforms are cross related and integrated, inevitably conflicting with one another, for example, the distribution of benefits arising from the process of cooperation between travel agencies and cultural tourism scenic spots, the sales promotion problem between travel agencies and tourists, and the premium price of booking on online platforms. These problems are prone to a low effectiveness of cooperation among the three and low satisfaction of tourists in the consumption process. A correct understanding of the cooperative relationship among cultural tourism scenic spots, travel agencies and online platforms is conducive to promoting cooperation among the three in a stable and orderly manner, facilitating the synergistic development of the country's cultural tourism market, and improving tourists' satisfaction and experience in tourism.
Cultural tourism scenic spots, travel agencies, and online platforms can quickly formulate decisions based on their experience in the decision-making process. But an analytical method based on mathematical modeling is rigorous in reasoning. In the face of the complexity of a mutually constrained correlation among cultural tourism scenic spots, travel agencies, online platforms and tourists, evolutionary games can maximize the reduction of variable correlations. Reviewing previous research reveals that scholars have conducted in-depth studies on the interactive relationships and influencing factors in the tourism market. The primary focus of this research has mostly been on the two-party or three-party interactions among cultural tourism enterprises, travel agencies, and tourists. However, the reality of the cultural tourism market is a complex system involving multiple interacting subjects, and studying only two-or three-party relationships can easily lead to incomplete research results. Putting the four participants: cultural tourism scenic spots, travel agencies, online platforms, and tourists, under a unified framework simultaneously can make up for the shortcomings of previous studies. This approach allows for a comprehensive and complete analysis of the dynamic evolution process of the strategic choices made by different participating subjects in the tourism market environment. Therefore, this paper constructs a quadrilateral evolutionary game model, which takes into account the premium behavior of online platforms, the distribution of benefits between cultural tourism scenic spots and travel agencies, the sales promotion behavior of travel agencies, and the satisfaction of tourists. Through numerical simulation, we have deeply studied the influence of the factors of the cultural tourism market on the behavioral decisions of the game subjects. We hope this article can provide theoretical support and decision-making reference for an effective collaboration between cultural tourism scenic spots and travel agencies, and a further understanding of the pricing mechanism of online platforms. This will contribute to the theoretical support and decision-making reference for high-satisfaction collaboration between online platforms and tourists.
Here are four key findings from our study: (1)In most cases, cultural tourism scenic spots tend to opt for a stable cooperative strategy. The preferential ratio of online platforms and the unit effort cost of travel agencies are the main factors affecting the choice of cooperative strategies by cultural tourism scenic spots, and they show a negative impact. (2)Travel agents are more concerned about cost and popularity. This is manifested in the fact that when the cost of travel agency services rises, or when the base price of cultural tourism scenic area products rises, or when the unit cost of effort increases, travel agencies will quickly transform into a non-cooperative stable state. When the popularity of cultural tourism scenic spots rises, or when the popularity of travel agencies rises, travel agencies will quickly reach a stable state of cooperation. In addition, as the cost of unilateral cooperative efforts in cultural tourism scenic spots increases, the free-riding behavior of travel agencies becomes more serious. The extent to which cultural tourism scenic spots offer concessions to travel agencies can significantly promote cooperation between the two parties. (3)In most cases, online platforms choose a price increase as a stable strategy. Online platforms opt for discounts only if: 1)Tourist satisfaction and favorable ratings are highly influenced by the price of the product. 2)Online platform discount strategy brings a higher visitor growth rate to the cultural tourism scenic spots, and online platforms offer a bigger discount for the products of the cultural tourism scenic spots. 3)The percentage of concessions from cultural tourism scenic spots to online platforms is higher, and online platforms offer a bigger discount for cultural tourism products. 4)Platform covers a minor part of discount cost. (4)In most cases, tourists tend to prefer independent travel. Tourists prefer group tours only if: 1)Tourists value the service quality more and the cost of travel agency services is higher. 2)Cultural tourism product's price is excessively high. 3)The travel agency is well known and travelers prefer renowned travel agencies.

Key words: cultural tourism attractions, travel agency, online tourism platform, quadrilateral evolutionary game, cooperation evolution