关键词: 首席独立董事, 股价崩盘风险, 代理成本, 信息透明度

Abstract: In order to strengthen the role of independent directors in corporate governance, the “Opinions on Reforming the Independent Directors System of Listed Companies” issued by the General Office of the State Council in April 2023 clearly stated: “A mechanism for special meetings entirely attended by independent directors should be established. Potential major conflicts of interests such as related-party transactions should be subject to prior approval by a special meeting of independent directors before being submitted to the board of directors for review”. In practice, the director convening and presiding over this meeting becomes the de facto lead independent director. Notably, 96% of large U.S. listed companies have established this role to mitigate risks such as stock price crashes through enhanced oversight. Similarly, some Chinese firms, like Zijin Mining, have appointed lead independent directors to improve information transparency and management-board communication, thereby reducing stock price crash risk. Based on this, from the perspective of a focal firm, this study proposes the following research questions: (1)Can the establishment of a lead independent director reduce stock price crash risk? (2)What is the mechanism by which the lead independent directors affect stock price crash risk? (3)Under different internal and external environments, what are the heterogeneous impact results of the lead independents director on stock price crash risk?
This study uses non-financial A-share listed companies in China from 2010 to 2023 as samples to empirically test the relationship between the lead independent directors and stock price crash risk. We collect data on lead independent directors from listed company websites and announcements,and other data from CSMAR. The study finds that the establishment of the lead independent director can reduce agency costs, and enhance corporate transparency, thereby reducing stock price crash risk. The results of heterogeneous analysis show that the inhibitory effect of the lead independent directors on stock price crash risk is more significant for companies with higher industry competitiveness and digital transformation, higher executive shareholding ratios, and higher institutional investor ratios.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, it advances the literature on board governance and stock price crash risk by foregrounding the governance significance of lead independent directors. Prior research largely centers on board structures, neglecting the pivotal leadership and monitoring functions unique to lead independent directors. By providing empirical evidence, this study establishes the influence on crash risk, thereby demonstrating governance value and offering theoretical support for institutional design and policy formulation.
Second, this paper deepens the understanding of the mechanisms through which lead independent directors curtail crash risk. Despite growing recognition of the importance, the micro-level channels of governance effects remain insufficiently identified. The findings indicate that lead independent directors effectively curb crash risk by reducing agency costs and enhancing information transparency, underscoring their supervisory role in preventing opportunistic managerial behavior.
Third, this study expands the institutional context of research on lead independent directors. Existing evidence predominantly derives from developed economies, where the system is designed to counter CEO dominance and accompanied by substantial compensation incentives. In contrast, Chinas lead independent directors mainly chair independent directors meetings, maintain independence, and are neither mandatory nor financially privileged. By examining their governance effects in emerging-market setting, this paper provides context-specific evidence and enriches the global understanding of the lead independent director.

Key words: lead independent directors, stock price crash risk, agency costs, information transparency