基于演化博弈视角的植物品种权价值链合作伙伴行为协调机制研究

运筹与管理 ›› 2014, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (5): 205-212.

基于演化博弈视角的植物品种权价值链合作伙伴行为协调机制研究

高洁

潍坊学院经济管理学院,山东潍坊 261061

收稿日期:2012-06-13 出版日期:2021-05-25
作者简介:高洁(1980-),女,山东潍坊人,博士,潍坊学院讲师,研究方向:农业经济管理。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目“植物品种权价值链衔接模式、演化机制及其优化管理”(71173138);山东省软科学研究计划项目“基于价值链分析的种业知识产权保护方法与途径探讨”(2012RKA07005)

Coordination Mechanism Analysis of Partners' Behavior in Plant Variety Right Value Chain Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

GAO Jie

School of Economy and Management, Weifang University, Weifang 261061, China

Received:2012-06-13 Online:2021-05-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文提出了植物品种权价值链合作伙伴行为协调的概念,应用演化博弈的双种群理论,研究了植物品种权价值链合作伙伴行为协调的博弈演化过程及影响因素。研究表明,协调演化方向受协调成本、协调收益、超额收益分配比例、成本分摊比例、单独合作收益、背叛收益和奖惩金额等因素的影响。提高协调收益和单方面合作收益,降低协调成本和背叛收益,保持合作双方支付的成本与双方合作超额收益的分配正相关,建立合理的超额收益分配机制,加强外部监管和惩罚力度,将会促进植物品种权价值链合作伙伴行为向全面协调的方向演化。

关键词: 价值链管理, 合作行为, 复制动态, 演化稳定策略

Abstract: In this paper, the conception of partners' behavior coordination of plant variety right value chain is presented. Based on the dual population theory of evolutionary game, we study the evolutionary game processes and related influencing factors of partners' behavior coordination in plant variety right value chain. The research shows that the coordination evolution direction is affected by the coordination cost, coordination income, coefficient of excess income distribution, cost apportionment ratio, independent-cooperation income, betrayal income and the amount of reward and punishment. It will promote the overall coordination of partners' behavior in plant variety right value chain by improving coordination income and independent-cooperation income, reducing coordination cost and betrayal income, keeping a positive correlation between the shared cost and the excess obtained income between partners, building a reasonable excess income distribution mechanism and strengthening external supervision and punishment.

Key words: value chain management, partners' behavior, replicator dynamic, evolutionary stable strategy

中图分类号:

F302.6

高洁. 基于演化博弈视角的植物品种权价值链合作伙伴行为协调机制研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2014, 23(5): 205-212.

GAO Jie. Coordination Mechanism Analysis of Partners' Behavior in Plant Variety Right Value Chain Based on Evolutionary Game Theory[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2014, 23(5): 205-212.

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