关键词: 合作治理, 演化博弈, 演化稳定策略, 公共物品博弈

Abstract: Environmental pollution has significant cross-regional characteristics, and environmental resources have the characteristics of public goods. It is difficult to achieve effective results in the treatment of pollutants by single pollution-producing enterprises. Multi-enterprise cooperation within the same jurisdiction is the only way for environmental protection. This paper researches on the evolutionary process of decision among multiple enterprises from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. The evolutionary game model between multi-enterprises governments is established. Considering environmental degradation risk brought by total emissions more than the capacity threshold, we focus on the effect of risk on the emergence of cooperation to reduce emissions among enterprises. The results show that higher governance cost strongly constraints the behavior choice of profit-seeking enterprises to governance pollution, causing social dilemma-the tragedy of the commons. Based on higher governance cost, we find that the dilemma is relieved in high-risk situations where cooperation is likely to persist and dominate defection. Large initial endowment and emissions charges to enterprises can effectively promote the enterprise to control the pollutant discharging, in order to protect their private endowment. Finally, some policy suggestions for the implementation of environmental regulation are proposed.

Key words: cooperative governance, evolutionary game, evolutionary stable strategy, public goods games